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THE NATURAL LAW COMPONENT OF
THE NINTH AMENDMENT
Calvin R. Massey*
Natural law both frightens and fascinates us. We fear it because
we suspect that "you can invoke natural law to support anything you
want."' We are fascinated with it because it holds the promise of
providing a normative reference point which reconciles the ageless
conundrum of free choice (to which moral responsibility can be at-
tached) in a causally determined universe (from which individual
moral responsibility appears to be absent). If there is some plausi-
ble way of ascribing normative significance to the determinate
events of our existence, then we have located a standard by which
the nominal free choice of an actor within that constrained and de-
termined world can be judged. Even more importantly, this stan-
dard is one which may operate to legitimate evaluation and rejection
of governmental rules which contravene the normative natural or-
der. We fear that this quest is illusory, that there is no such discov-
erable standard, and that all attempts to locate one must degenerate
into either unprincipled assertions of personal preference 2 or state-
ments at such a high order of abstraction that they are "uselessly
vague."
3
The duality of this preoccupation with natural law has been a part
of American constitutional law since its inception. From the cele-
brated debate between Justices Samuel Chase and James Iredell in
Calder v. Bull 4 to Justice Clarence Thomas, constitutional scholars
and judges have flirted with natural law as a device to amplify, sup-
plement, or simply fill the interstices of the written law of the Con-
stitution.5 The legitimacy of natural law as an aspect of
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A.,
Whitman College; M.B.A., Harvard University; J.D., Columbia University.
1. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 50
(1980).
2. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 339
(1931) (stating that "natural law has had as its content whatever the individual in
question desired to advocate"); see also CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC
366, 375 (1953) (noting that in Revolutionary times, natural law assumed different
shapes in service of "different peoples and purposes").
3. ELY, supra note 1, at 51. Ely's example is the statement "no one should
needlessly inflict suffering." Id.
4. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
5. Among the academic contributions to this literature are Edward S. Corwin, The
"Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928) (Part
One); Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 365 (1928) (Part Two); Thomas Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:
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constitutional law has been assailed on two major fronts. Some
have contended that there is no textual or historical warrant for
reading such a principle into the Constitution.6 If by some feat of
intellectual legerdemain it is possible to do so, it is still claimed to
be impossible to locate principles of natural law which can serve as
rules of decision in any particular case without resorting to one's
personal preferences about the issues in question.
This article is an attempt to confront and rebut these objections
to any place for natural law in the constitutional constellation. I
have argued in the past that the Ninth Amendment 7 is natural law's
logical textual home within the Constitution," that the constitutional
framers intended it, in part, to perform this role,9 and that a princi-
pled methodology for location of these unenumerated rights can be
devised. l0
In Part I of this article, I contend that the political and social theo-
ries which composed the intellectual heritage of the revolutionary
generation support the conclusion that the advent of the Constitu-
tion, including the Bill of Rights, did not operate to preclude natu-
ral law from a role in constitutional adjudication. Part II
summarizes the historical arguments concerning the founding gen-
eration's intentions for the Ninth Amendment, concluding that the
best account of the evidence is that the founding generation in-
tended the Ninth Amendment to serve multiple purposes, including
Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 492 (1978); Thomas
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Suzanna Sherry,
The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987). Notable examples of
the Supreme Court's employment of natural law methodology within the rubric of
constitutional adjudication include Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (in
which Court refused "to ascribe the source of [the right to travel to any] . . . particular
constitutional provision"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (locating
the right to privacy in "emanations formed by the penumbras" of certain of the
enumerated rights in the Constitution); Justice Miller's opinion in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857)
(inferring from framers' intent and structure of original constitutional design conclusion
that "the black man has no rights which the white man is bound to respect"); Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810) (finding the Georgia statute at issue to violate
"general principles which are common to our free institutions"); and the opinion of
Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 386 (1798).
6. See Raoul Berger, Natural Law and Judicial Review: Reflections of an Earthbound
Lawyer, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 5 (1992); Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early
American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of "Unwritten-
Individual Rights? 69 N.C. L. REV. 421 (1991).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IX: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
8. Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 305 (1987) (hereinafter Massey, Fundamental Rights].
9. Id. at 343.
10. Id. at 330-31, 337-43.
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a role as a judicially enforceable source of natural law rights. In Part
III, I will concede, for purposes of argument, that the framers may
have intended the Ninth Amendment to function as a device to pre-
vent a latitudinarian construction of the enumerated powers dele-
gated to Congress. This argument asserts that the Ninth
Amendment's sole function was to guard against the danger that
political actors might infer from the enumeration of individual
rights as categorical limitations upon the exercise of federal legisla-
tive power a corresponding increase in the implied powers of Con-
gress to act otherwise than in infringement upon the enumerated
rights."I For the purpose of argument, Part III grants this conten-
tion but contends that the structural role thereby envisioned for the
Ninth Amendment can only be obtained today by treating the
amendment as a source of individual rights judicially enforceable.
against, at the very least, the federal government. Part IV attempts
to provide an exposition of the method by which courts might locate
unenumerated rights grounded in natural law.
A significant caveat applies to the entire argument contained in
this article. I have argued elsewhere that judicially enforceable
Ninth Amendment rights should be recognized as consisting of two
11. See Thomas McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1215 (1990). McAffee appears to make this argument when he declared his
intention to defend the traditional view of the Ninth Amendment "as part of a scheme
for preserving . . . the concept of a national government of limited and enumerated
powers. The unenumerated rights, by this reading, are the rights of the people reserved
by the device of listing granted powers." Id. at 1218. "[T]he purpose of the ninth
amendment is to ensure these reserved rights . . . against any adverse inference that
might be drawn from the addition of a bill of rights." Id. at 1219-20. McAffee called this
approach the " 'residual rights' reading-underscoring that on this reading the other
rights retained by the people are defined residually from the powers granted to the
national government. . . . The residual rights reading sees the ninth amendment as
designed to preserve the scheme of limited powers for securing interests that include,
but are not necessarily limited to, traditional sorts of individual rights." Id. at 1221-22.
McAffee contrasted his residual rights reading of the Ninth Amendment with the
"affirmative rights" reading: the view "that the ninth amendment refers to
constitutional rights as we generally think of them today-legally-enforceable,
affirmatively defined limitations on governmental power on behalf of individual
claimants." Id. at 1222. The straightforward conclusion to be drawn from McAffee's
residual rights reading is that the Ninth Amendment should operate to preserve
retained rights by constraining the implied powers of the federal government.
However, at several points McAffee departed from this reading and made the broader,
and quite unwarranted, claim that the Ninth Amendment was designed only to negate
the specific inference that, because a right was enumerated (e.g., free speech) there was a
corresponding implied general power in Congress to regulate speech. Id. Though not
entirely free from doubt, I regard McAffee to be making the more sensible, and less
narrow, argument that the Ninth Amendment was designed to frustrate any attempts to
imply congressional power beyond the limits of the enumerated powers of Congress.
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distinct kinds with different sources of origin.' 2 One type of pro-
posed Ninth Amendment right is rooted in the positive law of state
constitutions. These rights would represent the aspect of the Ninth
Amendment that is preservative of federalism by vesting in the poli-
ties of each state the power to preserve aspects of human liberty
from invasion by either their state or federal governmental agents.'
3
The other type of proposed Ninth Amendment right is grounded in
natural law. These rights ought to be recognized as legitimate and
judicially enforceable constitutional norms for three sound reasons:
1) the text of the Ninth Amendment suggests that we do so, 2) the
framers of the Ninth Amendment may very well have intended pre-
cisely that result, and 3) even if the framers intended by the Ninth
Amendment only to hem in federal legislative power, that objective
can only be realized effectively today by reading the Ninth Amend-
ment as a source of individual rights to frustrate the boundless exer-
cise of federal legislative power. In this article I will not deal with
the dimension of the Ninth Amendment that is connected to state
constitutions as the source of constitutional liberties; I will examine
only the natural law aspect of the Ninth Amendment.
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION
No sensible attribution to the framers of an intended purpose for
the Ninth Amendment can be made without some understanding of
the intellectual background upon which they acted. This back-
ground was anything but monochromatic; the framers were widely
read, reflective and thoughtful consumers of diverse and often in-
compatible views on matters of political, economic, and social the-
ory. 14 When Americans of the late eighteenth century sought to
synthesize "the several traditions [they] had inherited from Britain
and Europe, [the resulting] body of literature by Americans about
America lacked explicit philosophical coherence. Nevertheless, it
reflected the profound sense of openness and broad socio-economic
opportunity, the ambivalence about authority and about traditional
conceptions of the social order ... that were perhaps the most im-
portant elements determining how Americans received and used the
12. Massey, Fundamental Rights, supra note 8, at 343.
13. For a fuller exposition of this argument, see Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-Federalist
Ninth Amendment and its Implications for State Constitutional Law, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1229.
14. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); JACK P. GREENE, THE INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ERA (1986); FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITTrrION (1985); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
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many elements of their rich ... intellectual inheritance."'15 It is thus
not surprising that Forrest McDonald concluded that "it is meaning-
less to say that the Framers intended this or intended that: their
positions were diverse and, in many particulars, incompatible."' 
6
This rather formidable caution ought to temper the zeal of those
who seek to reduce constitutional law to a matter of ascertaining
some supposed unitary original intention of the framers.' 7 How-
ever, even granting the insuperable difficulties of locating with any
degree of usable certainty the intentions of the framers, it may be
that we can discuss intelligently and derive some value from the na-
ture of the richly spiced intellectual stew that fed the creation of our
Constitution.
From a political standpoint, the framers were Englishmen. "From
the beginning of English settlement in North America, colonists be-
lieved themselves the equals of native Englishmen and entitled to
the 'rights of Englishmen'. ... "18 It is not as important whether
these rights were created by statute, common law, customary tradi-
tion, or inalienable "natural" and fundamental principles as it is to
understand the Revolutionary generation's eclectic and rather mud-
died conception of the nature of the "rights of Englishmen."
Colonial Americans would most likely have associated their in-
herited rights with the English tradition of constitutionalism. This
tradition recognized the unwritten English constitution, which "con-
sisted of a mixture of custom, natural law, religious law, enacted
law, and reason," to be fundamental "higher law... [which] existed
and operated to make void Acts of Parliament inconsistent with that
fundamental law."' 19 The mechanism of invalidation was, however,
15. GREENE, supra note 14, at 56.
16. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 224; see also James Q. Whitman, Why Did the
Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason? 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1321, 1323 (1991).
Whitman stated,
For generations, [we] have debated whether the legal thinking of the
American Revolutionaries was. "about" custom or "about" deductive
natural law.... Both ... interpretation[s] attribute much more coherence
and intelligibility to revolutionary era legal writings than those writings
possess. Revolutionary era lawyers unreflectively conflated reason and
custom-which means that, in many respects, we can never draw
definitive conclusions about constitutional interpretation from their
writings.
Id.
17. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPrING OF AMERICA (1990) (criticizing
departure from "original" understanding). For the view that the original intent of the
framers was that their intent would not bind future generations, see H. Jefferson Powell,
The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
18. Massey, Fundamental Rights, supra note 8, at 319-20.
19. Sherry, supra note 5, at 1129.
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more problematic. Suzanna Sherry contended that judges were
thought to be entitled to "use that fundamental law to pronounce
void inconsistent legislative or royal enactments." 20 Helen Michael
argued that, while such a power ofjudicial review might be found in
the theories of Coke, Bolingbroke, and the "Country" opposition
party of late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Britain, it was
not widely assumed by Americans, who preferred instead to vindi-
cate fundamental law in more populist fashion-through legislation
and, if necessary, revolution.2 1 As with so much that pertains to our
revolutionary past, both views are accurate, a result that makes it
virtually impossible to dictate results for today from the verdicts of
history.
Coke
There can be no doubt that colonial Americans were heavily influ-
enced by Coke and the associated theories of the Country party op-
position. As Edward Corwin noted, Coke "was first on the ground"
in the colonies, which resulted in a pervasive "presence of Coke's
doctrines . .. during the latter two-thirds of the seventeenth cen-
tury." 22 Indeed, "the seventeenth century was Coke's""3 and while
"the early half of the eighteenth century was Locke's" 24 American
"independence brought with it the triumph, at least temporarily, of
the anti-capitalistic, 'country-party' ideology . . . of the English
Opposition."
25
An integral part of the Cokean ideology was the idea, set forth
most explicitly in Bonham's Case,26 that courts possessed the power
to invalidate legislation offensive to constitutional fundamental law.
Dr. Thomas Bonham practiced medicine without a certificate from
the Royal College of Physicians, although he held a medical degree
from Cambridge. The College Censors first fined him five pounds,
then imprisoned him when he continued to practice medicine. Bon-
ham sued the College Censors and President for false imprison-
ment. The College asserted in its defense its statute of
incorporation, which authorized it to regulate all physicians and
punish with fine and imprisonment practitioners not licensed by it.
The statute also gave the College one half of all fines imposed by it.
20. Id.
21. See generally, Michael, supra note 6.
22. Corwin, supra note 5, at 394.
23. Id. at 395.
24. Id.
25. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 59.
26. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610).
[Vol. 61
1992] NATURAL LAW IN THE NINTH AMENDMENT 55
In deciding against the College, Coke was of the opinion that
"[t]he censors cannot be judges, ministers, and parties; judges to
give sentence or judgment; ministers to make summons; and parties
to have the moiety of the forfeiture, because no person may be a
Judge in his own cause... ; and one cannot be Judge and attorney
for any of the parties. ... 27 But the enabling statute plainly
granted this power to the College. No matter, said Coke, for "it
appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will con-
troul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly
void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common
law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void. .... 28
Scholars have argued whether Coke's decision was rooted in a
constitutional mandate, vesting courts with the power of judicial re-
view of legislative acts, or merely one of strict statutory construc-
tion, rendering the quoted passage merely obiter dictum.
2 9
Regardless of the weight of the declaration, it seems unmistakable
that when Coke invoked "common right and reason" he was refer-
ring to "something fundamental, something permanent; ... higher
law ... binding on Parliament and the ordinary courts alike."
30
Whatever its merits, the academic debate came later. Colonial
Americans could read Coke for themselves, and did. Coke was pop-
ular in no small part because of his role in defending the rights of
parliament and the people against Stuart absolutism. His views
were clearly set forth in his Institutes, particularly in the Second Insti-
tute, which restated the rights of Englishmen under Magna Charta
and succeeding statutes. In the prologue to the Second Institute, Coke
cited parliamentary enactments that invalidated any law or action
contrary to Magna Charta. As Professor Howard has observed,
"Coke was speaking of statutes which had thus enshrined Magna
Charta, but his commentaries helped lay the way for the view, sub-
scribed to in the American colonies, of the Charter as a kind of
27. Id. at 652.
28. Id.
29. Professor Plucknett contended that the case states a theory of fundamental law.
See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 337 (1956);
Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 68-70
(1926). Professor Thorne asserted that the case supports only a theory of strict
statutory construction. See S.E. Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54 LAw Q. REV. 543, 548-52
(1938).
30. Corwin, supra note 5, at 370, 372.
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superstatute, a constitution placing fundamental liberties beyond
the reach of Parliament as well as the King and his ministers." 3 1
But Americans did not understand Coke to confine judicial review
to cases of parliamentary invasion of Magna Charta or other written
declarations of the rights of Englishmen. When James Otis, Jr.
thundered against the validity of general writs of assistance in Pax-
ton's Case32 (the Writs of Assistance Case) he had no doubt that Bon-
ham's Case was good authority for the proposition that courts could
invalidate legislation on the grounds that it offended "fundamental
Principles of Law." 33 John Adams, who witnessed Otis's perform-
ance, later declared that "[t]hen and there the child independence
was born," 34 for the clear implication of Otis's assertion was that
any colonial court possessed authority to invalidate the legislation of
the imperial Parliament. To Corwin, this principle was nothing
short of the birth of American constitutional law.35
It was not a principle that went unused in the turbulent final years
of colonial existence. A Virginia court declared the Stamp Act to be
unconstitutional, 36 while arguments in Massachusetts against the
Stamp Act were that "the Act ... is against Magna Charta, and the
natural Rights of Englishmen, and therefore, according to Lord
Coke, null and void." 37 Even the loyalist judges in Massachusetts
31. A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 122 (1968). Coke could be
maddeningly inconsistent. In the Fourth Part of his Institutes he opined that "the power
and jurisdiction of... Parliament ... is so transcendent and absolute ... it cannot be
confined either for causes or persons within any bounds." EDWARD COKE, FOURTH PART
OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 36 (1681). But this statement is followed by
examples of its "boundless" exercise, most of which amount to Parliament's ability to
alter the common or statutory law of the realm. Coke cited one case-the attainder of
Thomas Cromwell, Earl of Essex, during the reign of Henry VIII-in which Henry's
judges, much pressed by the King, expressed the view that Parliament could attaint
without giving the subject any opportunity to respond to the charge. Of this, Coke said
that "their opinion was according to law, yet might they have made a better answer, for
[by] ... Mag[na] Char[ta] ... no man ought to be condemned without answer." Id. at
38. The reader is left wondering whether Coke thought Parliament exceeded its
authority or the judges simply erred. Even if Coke's view of parliamentary power in his
Institutes is irreconcilable with his view in Bonham's Case, the most telling fact is that
colonial Americans relied on Bonham's Case, not the Institutes, to proclaim the legitimacy
of a judicial check upon parliamentary power.
32. QUINCY'S MASSACHUSETrS REPORTS 51 (1761) and appendices 395-552, of which
469-85 are especially germane. See also MAURICE H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE
CASE (1978).
33. QUINEY'S MASSACHUSETrS REPORTS at 471. Otis expressly invoked the authority
of Bonham's Case. Id. at 474.
34. 10 ADAMS, LIFE AND WORKS 248 (C.F. Adams ed., 1850), quoted in Corwin, supra
note 5, at 398.
35. Corwin, supra note 5, at 398.
36. Id. at 399.
37. QUINCY'S MASSACHUSETrS REPORTS 527 n.28.
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agreed that "an Act of Parliament against natural Equity is void."
38
Nor was this principle confined to imperial legislation. George Ma-
son relied upon Coke to argue successfully to a Virginia court that a
1682 act of the Virginia Assembly should be declared void.39 This is
not to suggest that Otis's argument in the Writs of Assistance Case
sparked an unbroken trend toward vigorous exercise of judicial re-
view in the service of unwritten fundamental law;40 rather, it is only
to claim that the Cokean legacy was a powerful and influential as-
pect of the intellectual heritage of the framers.
Locke and the Continental Enlightenment
If Coke provided the jurisprudential foundation for American
lawyers, John Locke supplied much of the political theory that actu-
ated the revolutionary generation. 4 1 "The Patriots turned to Locke
rather than to the other great natural law theorists-Hugo Grotius,
Samuel von Pufendorf, Thomas Rutherforth, Burlamaqui, Vattel-
for the reason that none of the others was so well adapted to their
purposes."42 Only Locke provided a convincing rationale for inde-
pendence by declaring that governments which "act contrary to
their Trust ... put themselves into a state of War with the People,
who are thereupon absolved from any farther Obedience."
43
More generally, Locke posited that the original position of hu-
manity was a "state of nature"-a social existence without govern-
ment-in which people possessed certain inalienable rights, but that
out of "strong obligations of necessity, convenience and inclina-
tion," people constitute governments. 44 The social contract 45 thus
made involves the surrender of some individual rights in order to
secure the remainder more effectively. The gospel of the Lockean
social contract-" [n]atural rights and the social compact, govern-
ment bounded by law and incapable of imparting legality to meas-
38. Id. at 527-28 n.28.
39. Corwin, supra note 5, at 399 n.108.
40. For discussion of the problematic status of judicial review in the last quarter of
the eighteenth century, see infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
41. Corwin, supra note 5, at 395-404.
42. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 60.
43. JoHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 430 (Peter Laslett ed., 1967)
(Book 2, §§ 221-22). Peter Laslett's edition is the definitive work, containing his
invaluable introduction, but I will also provide parenthetical citations to Locke's book
and section numbers, to aid the reader in finding cited material in other editions of
Locke's works.
44. Id. at 336-37 (Book 2, § 77).
45. Strictly speaking, there was "no contract as such, only a network of forced
exchanges designed to leave everyone better off than before." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 11 (1985).
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ures contrary to law, and the right of resistance to illegal
measures"-was regularly preached by colonial, particularly New
England, clergy, who used their pulpits as much for political as theo-
logical instruction.46
Locke contended that the legislature was the supreme and exclu-
sive lawgiver of the political commonwealth, 47 a position that Helen
Michael has taken to mean a complete repudiation of any constitu-
tional judicial review, whether based on positive or natural constitu-
tional law.48 While that may be the logical result of Locke's
statements, Americans blithely took liberties with the Lockean ca-
non. Locke's political theory was frequently fused with Coke's juris-
prudentialism to produce a peculiarly American brand of
constitutionalism. Edward Corwin contended that "the Massachu-
setts Circular Letter of 1768 . . .perfects the blend of Coke and
Locke" 49 by its assertions that, while "Parliament is the supreme
legislative power . . .[it] derives its power and authority from the
constitution .... [which] ascertains and limits both sovereignty and
allegiance."' 50 Significantly, the Massachusetts colonists also con-
tended that "essential, unalterable right[s], in nature, [were] en-
grafted into the British constitution, as a fundamental law, and ever
held sacred and irrevocable by the subjects within the realm." 5'
The Massachusetts Circular Letter was more than a mingling of
Locke and Coke; it was also alloyed with the Continental Enlighten-
ment. Vattel, for example, was quite explicit in his assertion that the
legislative and executive authority of government is subordinate to
"the fundamental laws of the state." 52  Both Pufendorf and
Burlamaqui contended that the sovereign was bound by natural law
and that, should the sovereign violate natural law, the people were
entitled to revolt to enforce their natural rights.53 Grotius was more
equivocal, for he flirted with the oxymoronic idea that people could
alienate their inalienable rights54 but simultaneously expressed the
46. Corwin, supra note 5, at 396.
47. LOCKE, supra note 43, at 374 (Book 2, § 134).
48. Michael, supra note 6, at 436.
49. Corwin, supra note 5, at 400.
50. Id. (quoting Massachusetts Circular Letter of 1768).
51. Id.
52. EMER VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 15 (John Chitty trans., 1849); see also id. at 8-
22 (Book I, Ch. 3 & 4) (discussing generally limits upon authority of prince and
legislature).
53. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 1068-72, 1105-11
(C.W. & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1964); 2 JEAN J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL LAW AND POLITIC LAW 37 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1807).
54. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 103-04 (Francis W. Kelsey trans.,
1964) (Book I, Ch. III, § VIII(l)).
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presumption that people could not part with the right to resist a
sovereign's misconduct.
55
The colonial alloy was peculiar to America. It fused Lockean and
Continental notions of natural law as a limit upon sovereignty (al-
beit one not susceptible of judicial enforcement) with the Cokean
notion that judicial review was an appropriate and legitimate mecha-
nism by which to enforce these limiting principles of fundamental
law. While Lockean and Continental enlightenment political theory,
standing alone, might "undermine ... [the view] that judicial review
was a logical outgrowth of the diverse natural law tradition that the
American colonists embraced," 56 the importance of these theories is
that they cannot be considered in isolation. Just as birds use wildly
disparate elements to construct their nests, the colonists fashioned
their applied political theory from similarly incongruous sources.
Colonial lawyers transformed their sources, rather than being con-
strained by them. It is myopic to think that they hewed carefully to
the logical limits of the theories they embraced. These were men on
a mission who were impatient with the intellectual details that pre-
occupy the modem, detached observer.
The Radical Egalitarians
Among the other influences upon colonial political thought were
a number of disparate egalitarian thinkers: radical Whigs like John
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon (the authors of Cato's Letters) ,57 the
Protestant clergy of colonial America, 58 the Scottish Enlighten-
ment,59 and such American radicals as Thomas Paine. As with
Locke and the Continental natural law scholars, Americans ab-
sorbed these influences and put them to their own purposes.
55. Id. at 149 (Book I, Ch. IV, sec. VII(2)).
56. Michael, supra note 6, at 432.
57. See THE ENGLISH LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE FROM THE WRITINGS OF JOHN
TRENCHARD AND THOMAS GORDON (David L. Jacobsen ed., 1965) [hereinafter
TRENCHARD & GORDON]. Cato's Letters were written about 1720.
58. See generally ALICE M. BALDWIN, THE NEW ENGLAND CLERGY AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1928); Edmund Morgan, The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution, 24
WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1967).
59. See GREENE, supra note 14, at 45-52; McDONALD, supra note 14, at 54-55. Perhaps
the most vigorous champion of the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment upon
American political thought has been Garry Wills. See GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA:
THOMAS JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978). Some scholars sharply
dispute the influence that Wills attributes to the Scottish Enlightenment. See, e.g.,
Ronald Hamowy,Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Critique of Garry Wills's Inventing
America: Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 503, 509 (1979);
Harry Jaffa, Inventing the Past: Garry Wills's Inventing America and the Pathology of Ideological
Scholarship, 33 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 3 (1981).
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Trenchard and Gordon were, in a sense, radical Lockeans. They
contended that political society rested on a compact between the
people and their governmental agents, 60 relied on the legislative
agents of the people to safeguard their liberties,6' but recognized
that the legislature was subject to the limits of fundamental law.
62
Like Pufendorf and Burlamaqui, Trenchard and Gordon believed
that the remedy for legislative action infringing upon fundamental
law was to hold frequent elections63 and, if necessary, revolution. 4
The Protestant clergy of colonial America "taught their flocks
political theory .. .[and, a]fter the Bible, Locke was the principal
authority relied on by the preachers .. "..",65 While the colonial
clergy consisted of New England Puritans, Southern Anglicans, and
dissenters of all kinds, their message was the familiar one of
"[n]atural rights and social compact, government bounded by [fun-
damental] law .... and the right of resistance to illegal measures
.... ,"66 To be sure, there were disturbing notes of extreme egalitar-
ianism sounded by George Whitefield, the preacher at the center of
the "Great Awakening" of the mid-eighteenth century. While more
established clerics recoiled from Whitefield's challenge to authority,
his message resonated with the mass of colonial Americans and con-
tributed to the doctrinal cacophony that makes it so difficult to as-
sess today some shared intention with respect to any given practice
or principle.
The Scottish Enlightenment thinkers were, perhaps, the most rad-
ical of all. They argued that all people are endowed with equal ca-
pabilities for moral reasoning and, as a result, concluded that this
inherent, natural moral equality dictated political equality.6 7 This
sentiment, echoed in the Declaration of Independence's assertion
that "all men are created equal," was "but a short step to radical
60. TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 57, at 128 (Gordon, Letter No. 62, Jan 20,
1721).
61. Id. at 121 (Trenchard, Letter No. 60, Jan. 6, 1721).
62. See WOOD, supra note 14, at 291-92.
63. TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 57, at 121 (Trenchard, Letter No. 60, Jan. 6,
1721).
64. See WOOD, supra note 14, at 292.
65. Corwin, supra note 5, at 396.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., BAILYN, supra note 14, at 303 (discussing erosion of hierarchical society);
McDONALD, supra note 14, at 87-89 (discussing effect of sumptuary laws on federalist
system); WILLS, supra note 59, at 228; WOOD, supra note 14, at 118 (noting moral
component of American Revolutionary thought).
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democracy," 6 in which "the spirit of the law... [should] be consid-
ered ... only on appeal to the representatives of the people.
'69
Radical egalitarianism was much in evidence in Thomas Paine's
Common Sense.70 Paine asserted that "the equal rights of nature"
compelled the conclusion that government should be perfectly egal-
itarian.7 l In short, Paine espoused an unvarnished majoritarianism,
in which there would be "no distinctions" and thus "no superiority"
among those composing the polity.
7 2
In one important sense, all Of these egalitarian components of co-
lonial political theory were at odds with Cokean jurisprudentialism.
While the egalitarians and Coke might agree that the "law of nature
is part of the laws of England... [and] is that which God at the time
of creation... infused into his heart,173 they would be far less likely
to concur that only those "schooled in the artificial reason and judg-
ment of the law" 74 were entitled to decide when legislation contra-
vened the fundamental law of nature.
The Application of Diverse Political Theoy
The Revolutionary generation simultaneously employed two con-
ceptions of how fundamental natural law could be used to protect
human liberty. The jurisprudential strain associated with Coke and
his forebears relied upon judges to invoke natural law to check exec-
utive and legislative abuses. An admixture of the continental natu-
ral law thinkers and various radical egalitarians counseled colonial
Americans to rely instead upon majoritarian democracy to discern
and apply the fundamental principles of natural law.
Neither of these visions can be said to have wholly captured the
Revolutionary imagination. As Forrest McDonald has observed, in-
68. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 54.
69. WOOD, supra note 14, at 301-02.
70. The tract is partially reprinted in JOSEPH LEWIS, THOMAS PAINE: AUTHOR OF THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 55-80 (1947).
71. Id. at 59-70.
72. Id. at 70.
73. Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 392 (K.B. 1609).
74. Prohibitions del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (K.B. 1609). This is, of course,
one of the celebrated moments in legal history: Coke's temerity in telling James I to his
face that he lacked sufficient "artificial reason and judgment" to decide matters of law.
Coke was not breaking new ground; he was squarely in the tradition of such earlier
English lawyers as Sir John Fortescue, Henry IV's ChiefJustice. In his renowned work,
De Laudibus Legum Angliae (Praises of the Laws of England), he instructed the imaginary
Prince that he will "not need to explore the mysteries of the law of England by long
study; ... [or] to investigate precise points of the law ..., but these should be left to
your judges .... [since] the experience of [law] necessary for judges is scarcely attainable
in the labours of twenty years." JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LANDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE, 23, 25
(S.B. Chrimes trans. & ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1949) (n.p., n.d.).
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dependence produced only the temporary triumph of the radical
egalitarian approach.75 The initial reaction to independence was
enthusiastic embrace of a radical vision of majoritarian democracy,
but within a short time this vision began to be supplanted or aug-
mented by the Cokean jurisprudential notions of political arrange-
ment. A representative sample of political events from
revolutionary America provides some telling and paradigmatic ex-
amples of the evanescence of radical egalitarianism.
The Revolutionary Pennsylvania Constitutions
In 1776, Pennsylvania adopted a constitution which reflected the
ideals of radical democracy.7 6 It relied almost exclusively upon the
legislature to conduct the popular will into governmental action.
There was no governor; rather, executive functions were to be per-
formed by a popularly elected committee. 77 The legislature con-
trolled the tenure of judges, who in any case could only serve for
seven years.78 "[T]o make the legislature more responsive to its
theoretical master, the people, Pennsylvania required annual elec-
tions of representatives, required representatives to subject their
acts to the instructions of their constituents, and required the legis-
lature to submit proposed legislation to popular review."' 79 The
political climate which produced Pennsylvania's 1776 constitution
and others imbued with its revolutionary zeal was one in which "few
Americans except lawyers trusted a truly independent judiciary
80
or, for that matter, a strong executive or even a legislature much
distanced from the people. It is likely correct to observe of these
manifestations of revolutionary political doctrine that "the notion
that the judges should be so independent as to have power to ...
pass upon the constitutionality of laws enacted by the legislative
75. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 59.
76. See 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3081-92 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) (Pa.
Declaration of Rights and Const. of 1776) [hereinafter Thorpe]. According to Stephen
Presser, "[o]f all the state constitutions [adopted in the revolutionary period],
Pennsylvania's was the purest application of revolutionary political theory to
government." STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 115 (2d ed. 1989). Gordon Wood has declared that Pennsylvania's
was "the most radical constitution of the Revolution." WOOD, supra note 14, at 85.
77. 5 Thorpe, supra note 76, at 3086-87 (PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19).
78. Id. at 3088 (PA. CONST. of 1776, § 23).
79. STEPHEN PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE
AMERICANS, AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE 28 (1991) (footnote
omitted).
80. MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 85.
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bodies was alien to [the egalitarian strain] of American theory and
practice." 8'
The practical result of its 1776 constitution was to make Penn-
sylvania "the most unstable state in the country ... a sort of... late
twentieth-century California." 82 Accordingly, "[a]s a means of re-
dressing this instability, Pennsylvania conservatives managed in
1790, to create a new state constitution modeled on that of the fed-
eral government .. .[and] reflect[ing] its framers' desire to lessen
popular influence."18 3 If Pennsylvania's 1776 constitution may be
regarded as the prototypical revolutionary charter "establishing leg-
islative supremacy," its 1790 constitution was characteristic of "the
reaction to legislative supremacy. . ., [enabling] a new appreciation
of the role of the judiciary in American politics." 84 As Gordon
Wood has noted, "[b]y the 1780's the judiciary in several states...
was gingerly and often ambiguously moving in isolated but impor-
tant cases to impose restraints on what the legislatures were enact-
ing as law." 85
Judicial Review by State Courts in the 1780s
Just as Pennsylvania sought by constitutional change to temper its
radical egalitarianism, the nature of judicial review in the 1780s re-
flects a similar assimilation of radical egalitarianism and Cokean
jurisprudentialism. Because American political theory was in flux
during the decade it is not surprising that the handful of known in-
stances in which state courts arguably asserted the power to invali-
date legislation as contrary to fundamental law86 have proven to be
81. Id.
82. PRESSER, supra note 79, at 30, 55.
83. Id. at 30.
84. WOOD, supra note 14, at 454.
85. Id. at 454-55.
86. There is general agreement that the list includes the following eight cases.
Josiah Philips's Case (Va. 1778), described in 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 944-48 (1953); CHARLES G.
HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 89-92 (2d ed. 1959); 1 ST.
GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Appendix 293 (1803) [hereinafter TUCKER'S
BLACKSTONE]; William P. Trent, The Case of Josiah Philips, 1 AM. HIST. REV. 444 (1896);
Jesse Turner, A Phantom Precedent, 48 AM. L. REV. 321, 322 (1914).
Holmes v. Walton (NJ. 1780), described in CROSSKEY, supra, at 948-52; HAINES, supra at
92-95; Austin Scott, Holmes v. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent: A Chapter in the History of
Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, 4 AM. HIST. REV. 456, 457 (1899).
Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 634 (1782), described in CROSSKEY, supra, at
952-61; HAINES, supra, at 95-98.
Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in JULIUS GOEBEL, JR.,
THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 393
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susceptible to differing interpretations.8 7 The meaning of these
cases has been parsed before; I propose only a few additional
observations.
Josiah Philips's Case
Josiah Philips was a notorious brigand during the Revolution. In
May of 1778, the Virginia legislature passed a bill of attainder pro-
viding that, unless Philips surrendered himself prior to the end of
June he would be automatically "convicted and attainted of high
treason" and subjected to "the pains of death."8 8 Philips was appre-
hended sometime in June, 1778, prior to the effective date of the
attainder. 89 However, since he had not voluntarily surrendered
himself, there must have been some uncertainty surrounding the ap-
plicability of the attainder. Philips was tried and convicted in ac-
cordance with ordinary common law procedures, rather than
pursuant to the attaint.90
Two radically different explanations have been offered for the fail-
ure to rely upon the attainder. According to St. George Tucker, "an
associate of some of [Philips's] ... judges ... [and who] was familiar
with the circumstances of the case," 9' Philips "was brought before
the ... court to receive sentence of execution pursuant to the [at-
tainder] ... [b]ut the court refused to pass the sentence and he was
put upon trial according to the ordinary course of law." 92 To
(1964), described in CROSSKEY, supra, at 962-65; HENRY B. DAWSON, THE CASE OF
ELIZABETH RUTGERS VERSUS.JOSHUA WADDINGTON (Morrisania, New York 1866); HAINES,
supra, at 98-104, Sherry, supra note 5, at 1136-38.
Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. 1786), described in CROSSKEY, supra, at 965-68; HAINES, supra, at
105-12; JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETF V. WEEDEN: ON INFORMATION AND
COMPLAINT, FOR REFUSING PAPER BILLS IN PAYMENT FOR BUTCHER'S MEAT, IN MARKET, AT
PAR WITH SPECIE (1787); Sherry, supra, note 5, at 1138-41; Charles Warren, Earliest Cases
of Judicial Review of State Legislation by Federal Courts, 32 YALE LJ. 16 (1922).
Symsbury Case, 1 Kirby 444 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1785), described in CROSSKEY, supra, at
961; HAINES, supra, at 104.
Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 42 (1787), described in CROSSKEY, supra, at 971-74;
HAINES, supra, at 112-20.
The "Ten-Pound Act" Cases (N.H. 1786), described in CROSSKEY, supra, at 969-71.
There is a ninth case, described by Haines as "a Massachusetts precedent," that is
probably spurious. See HAINES, supra, at 120-21; see also CROSSKEY, supra, at 961-62.
87. Perhaps the leading advocate of the position that the American instances of
judicial review in the 1780s are false precedents was W.W. Crosskey. See CROSSKEY,
supra note 86, at 938-75; Michael, supra note 6, at 448-457. For the opposite view, see
Sherry, supra note 5, at 1134-46.
88. CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 944-45 (quoting Virginia legislation).
89. Id. at 945.
90. Id.; see also HAINES, supra note 86, at 90.
91. HAINES, supra note 86, at 91 n.6.
92. TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE, supra note 86, at 293.
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Tucker, this was "decisive proof... of the independence of the judi-
ciary." 93 Since the 1776 Virginia Constitution" contained no ex-
plicit prohibitions of bills of attainder, though it did contain explicit
guarantees pertaining to trial procedures, 95 the judicial intervention
described by Tucker might have been based, in part, on some un-
written conception of fundamental law that ranked on a par with the
Virginia Constitution. The contrary explanation is that, since the
bill of attainder had not become effective, there was no reason to do
anything other than apply common law. On this view, "the case had
nothing whatever to do with judicial review."
96
Whatever the actual explanation may have been for the failure to
apply the legislative attainder to Philips, when Philips's Case became a
subject of debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention the dele-
gates ,who spoke to the matter uniformly, and wrongly, assumed that
Philips had, in fact, been condemned pursuant to the attaint. 97 To
William Crosskey, this was "sufficient to show that, among Virgini-
ans, in 1788, the Philips case was, very clearly, not regarded as a
great landmark ofjudicial review." 98 That may well be so, for it was
St. George Tucker, writing in 1803, who understood Philips's Case to
be an instance of judicial review. Nevertheless, the Virginians of
1788 debated the validity of the attaint in terms of natural justice, a
fact which suggests that they did not regard their written constitu-
tion of 1776 to have supplanted unwritten fundamental law. Patrick
Henry, Governor of Virginia at the time of Philips's Case, defended
93. Id. Cf EDWARD CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: ITS LEGAL AND
HISTORICAL BASIS AND OTHER ESSAYS 71 (1914) (describing Tucker as "zealous
champion of judicial review" and claiming his interpretation of case seeks "to create a
precedent out of hand" and is a "myth").
94. 7 Thorpe, supra note 76, at 3812-19; See 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CoNsTITrIoNS 48 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979) [hereinafter SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS].
95. 7 Thorpe, supra note 76, 3812-19. Section 8 of the 1776 Virginia Constitution
provided that "in all capital ... prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause
and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for
evidence in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his
vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty." Id. at 3813;
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 94, at 49. The legislative attaint of Philips would
certainly seem to contradict these guarantees, although it seems possible, though
implausible, that the provisions of this section could have been observed with the issue
of fact for jury decision being limited to whether the legislative attaint applied to Philips.
96. See CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 945; Turner, supra note 86, at 342.
97. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTIUTIxON 66-67 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (comments of Gov. Randolph)
(hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES); id. at 140 (comments of Mr. Henry); id. at 222-23
(comments of John Marshall); id. at 236 (comments of Mr. Harrison); id. at 298-99
(comments of Mr. Pendelton); id. at 450 (comments of Mr. Nicholas).
98. CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 947.
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the attaint as "justified by the laws of nature and nations." 99 Benja-
min Harrison, chairman of the very House of Delegates that enacted
the attaint, labeled Edmund Randolph's charges of its unconstitu-
tionality "very unjust ... [since Philips] was a man who, by the laws
of nations, was entitled to no privilege of trial."' 00 Edmund Pendle-
ton attacked the attaint as "repugnant to the principles of justice[,]
. . . contrary to the Constitution, and the spirit of the common
law."101
The Virginians' misunderstanding of their own contemporary his-
tory might indicate that they did not regard the case as an instance
of judicial review, but it certainly underscores their ready accept-
ance of natural law as coexisting with a written constitution. It may
well be Tucker's gloss that caused a later generation to regard the
case as an example of judicial review; or it may be that Tucker sim-
ply recorded a common understanding that came later; or it may be
that Tucker, one of the foremost legal commentators and scholars
of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Virginia, accurately
described an early, and advisory, instance of judicial review. If the
latter explanation is correct, perhaps the Virginians' treatment of
Philips's Case in the ratification debates reflects the advisory nature of
the judicial opinion. On this view, the Virginia courts simply ad-
vised counsel that prosecution under the attainder would violate
fundamental law, whether rooted in the Virginia Constitution or in
principles of natural justice. Even though counsel heeded that ad-
vice, the Virginia delegates found it politically expedient to debate
the legitimacy of the legislative act that went unenforced.
Though clouded by misunderstanding in 1788, it is clear that by
1803, when the influential Tucker wrote, Philips's Case had begun to
be understood as an early exemplar of judicial review. 10 2 That this
may have been due to what Crosskey derisively described as the
"oral tradition and the transient memories of judges and lawyers"
99. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 140.
100. Id. at 236.
101. Id. at 299.
102. See HAINES, supra note 86, at 91-92; ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, THE COURTS, THE
CONSTITUTION AND PARTIES: STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND POLITICS 48
(1912) (asserting that contemporary observers may have regarded the case as one "in
which the court asserted its independent right to interpret the constitution") That this
may have been due to what Crosskey derisively described as the "oral tradition and the
transient memories of judges and lawyers" does not diminish its effect. The oral
tradition and transient memories reflect the current importance of past events. The
importance of Philips's Case lies not so much in what actually transpired as in what the
immediately following generation thought happened.
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does not diminish its effect.' 03 Oral traditions and transient memo-
ries reflect the current importance of past events. The importance
of Philips's Case lies not so much in what actually transpired as in
what the immediately following generation thought happened.
Whatever the "true" understanding, Philips's Case epitomizes the
transformative nature of political thought in the 1780's, a time in
which radical egalitarianism (which treated natural law as a principle
capable of apprehension only by democratic legislatures) became in-
termingled with the Cokeanjurisprudentialism that regarded the ju-
diciary as the guardian of individual rights (whether derived from
written or unwritten fundamental law). It is no surprise that St.
George Tucker should have been an agent of that transformation
with respect to Philips's Case, since he regarded judicial review as in-
dispensable for the preservation of human liberty. 0 4
Holmes v. Walton
In 1778, the New Jersey legislature enacted a statute designed to
prevent.trading with the enemy, by providing for forfeiture of goods
taken in such trade. The statute, as applied, provided for a six-man
jury trial. The New Jersey Constitution preserved the jury trial
right, and prior practice applicable to cases of the type at issue was
to require a twelve-man jury. The New Jersey Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Crosskey con-
tended that the court did so because it found the trial judge's
interpretation of the statute to be in error, 0 5 but Crosskey admitted
that his conclusion is only a weighing of probabilities. We do know
that the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the conviction and that
it was urged to do so on the grounds that trial by six-man jury was
"contrary to law .... the constitution of New Jersey .... [and the]
practices ... of the land."'' 0 6 Fused together in this argument with-
out attempt to distinguish between them were appeals to custom,
reason, and written and unwritten fundamental law. As James Whit-
man has pointed out, this form of discourse-the intermingling of
sources of fundamental law-was characteristic of the revolutionary
generation. 1
0 7
103. CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 948 (quoting 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, SYSTEM OF THE
LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 1 (1795)).
104. See TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at 357.
105. CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 950.
106. Scott, supra note 86, at 458.
107. See generally Whitman, supra note 16, at 323 (discussing Revolutionary era legal
practice).
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We also know that the NewJersey Supreme Court was understood
by contemporary observers to have declared the act unconstitu-
tional. Residents of Monmouth County, where the case arose and
was tried, petitioned the New Jersey legislature to complain "that
the justices of the Supreme Court have set aside some of the laws as
unconstitutional."' I0 8 In neighboring Pennsylvania, Gouverneur
Morris argued to the legislature that it would be unconstitutional for
it to abolish a bank charter, and invoked Holmes v. Walton for the
proposition that Pennsylvania judges possessed the power to de-
clare legislation unconstitutional. 109
There can be little doubt that, during the 1780s, Holmes v. Walton
"was commonly regarded as a precedent for judicial review."' °10 It
is also likely true that "there was, at that time, hostility to the whole
idea ofjudicial review.""' The two positions provide further illus-
tration of the turbulence of political thought in the 1780s. Radical
egalitarianism, exemplified by legislative supremacy, was beginning
to shatter into a more complicated mosaic including, among other
things, Cokean jurisprudentialism.
Commonwealth v. Caton
The defendants in this 1782 case were convicted of treason under
a 1776 Virginia statute that vested the pardon power in both houses
of the Virginia legislature. The House of Delegates voted to grant a
pardon but the Senate refused. The defendants appealed to the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals, contending that the statute was
contrary to the Virginia Constitution." t2 The court found the stat-
ute to be in accord with the constitution' 13 but, in dicta, seven of the
eight judges "were of opinion, that the court had power to declare
108. Votes and Proceedings of N.J. Assembly 52 (Dec. 8, 1780), quoted in HAINES, spra
note 86, at 93.
109. See 3 SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GOVERNOR MORRIS, WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS
CORRESPONDENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS 438 (Boston, 1832), quoted and discussed in
CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 951-52.
110. CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 952.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 952-53; HAINES, supra note 86, at 95-97. The relevant provision of the
Virginia Constitution vested the pardon power in the Governor "except where.., the
law shall otherwise particularly direct; in which cases, no . . .pardon shall be granted,
but by resolve of the House of Delegates." 7 Thorpe, supra note 76, at 3817.
113. The conclusion is debatable, given the clear constitutional reference to the
House of Delegates. It is possible that the court was influenced in its decision by the fact
that the House of Delegates apparently thought it necessary to secure the Senate's
approval, or the Delegates would not have forwarded the pardon to the Senate for
action. See CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 955.
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,any resolution or act of the legislature... to be unconstitutional and
void."' 14
Were the power ofjudicial review to have been exercised in Caton,
'it would have been exercised with reference to a written constitu-
tion. However, certain of the rhetoric employed by George Wythe
suggests that he, at least, might, in the proper case, have regarded
himself as entitled to range well beyond the written Constitution to
void legislative actions violative of unwritten fundamental law.
Wythe invoked the Cokean proposition that it was the duty of the
judge "to protect the rights of the subject against the encroachment
.of the Crown" in order to declare that it was "equally [his duty] to
protect . . . the whole community against [legislative] usurpa-
tions." t5 When speaking in revolutionary America of the "en-
croachment[s] of the Crown," Wythe could not possibly be thought
to mean abuses wrought personally by the King; rather, the thrust of
revolutionary animus was directed toward the claimed invalidity of
legislation of the imperial Parliament. 16 Thus, when he invoked
the power of English judges "to protect a solitary individual against
the rapacity of the sovereign" he called upon a power rooted, if any-
where, in English traditions of an unwritten constitution.
Commonwealth v. Caton reflects the embryonic and tentative charac-
ter ofjudicial review in the transformative 1780s. Just as in Philips's
Case, where judicial review is likely to have assumed a purely advi-
sory, and non-binding character, Caton is another example ofjudges
claiming the power of judicial review without actually attempting to
enforce the claim. It is reasonable to expect judicial review in the
1780s to assume that shape as revolutionary America groped toward
a political rapprochement between the revolutionary ideal of demo-
cratic legislative supremacy and the other revolutionary tradition of
fundamental law, rooted in a mixture of sources, as a judicially en-
forceable check upon legislative abuse.
Rutgers v. Waddington
Elizabeth Rutgers sued Joshua Waddington, a British subject, for
trespass resulting from his possession of her malthouse pursuant to
an order of the British military authorities in occupied New York.
Rutgers's claim was founded on a New York statute that barred the
114. 8 Va. (4 Call) at 6, quoted in CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 953.
115. 8 Va. (4 Call) at 7, quoted in HAINES, supra note 86, at 96.
116. See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 239-45 (1988)
(describing Colonists' rejection of Thomas Whatley's secretary in the British Treasury
office, on theory that Parliament could tax the colonists because they were "virtually," if
not actually, represented).
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defense that the trespass was ordered by the military occupation au-
thorities. However, this statute was arguably contrary to the law of
nations, which recognized the right of captors to use captured real
estate; the 1783 Peace Treaty between the United States and the
United Kingdom, which contained mutual releases of claims such as
Rutgers's; and the Articles of Confederation.
1 7
The court employed an artful dodge that seems typical of the pe-
riod. It repeated the obligatory pieties about legislative
supremacy, Its declared that it was merely interpreting the statute to
avoid unintended conflict with the law of nations or the Peace
Treaty, and proceeded to uphold the statute but to deny relief. In
short, the court exercised a judicial power that "it specifically de-
clared no court had power to [exercise]. '""t 9 Moreover, the court
identified the problem as the conflict between the statute and the
law of nations, which it "equated . . . with the law of nature."'
20
Thus, the court's de facto exercise ofjudicial review was founded on
unwritten fundamental law.
Rutgers differed from the prior cases in that judicial review was not
advisory or hortatory. The court actually exercised the power,
though it clumsily sought to camouflage the fact, no doubt due to
the charged political atmosphere resulting from the reappraisal of
radical egalitarianism. Accordingly, it is not surprising that, like
Holmes v. Walton, the decision spawned protests of the claimed usur-
pation of legislative power. 121 Nor is it surprising that the case was
widely reported at the time,1 22 for it was vividly emblematic of the
movement toward greater judicial control of legislatures in the
name of fundamental law.
Trevett v. Weeden
Rhode Island imposed a penalty on all persons who refused to
accept paper money in discharge of their obligations, and permitted
no jury trial for prosecutions seeking to enforce the penalty. John
Weeden contended that the statute was void because the denial of
117. See CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 962-63; HAINES, supra note 86, at 98-99.
118. The court imitated Blackstone almost verbatim in declaring that, if the
legislature "think[s] fit positively to enact a law, there is no power which can control
them." DAWSON, supra note 86, at 40, quoted in HAINES, supra note 86, at 99; see also 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 91 (1765) ("[I]f the
Parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no
power that can control it.").
119. CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 964.
120. See Sherry, supra note 5, at 1138; see also Goebel, supra note 86, at 400, 404.
121. See CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 964.
122. Id. at 964-65.
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the jury trial right was contrary to fundamental law.' 2 3 Because
Rhode Island had no written constitution, Weeden's claim was a
pure appeal to the primacy of unwritten fundamental law. The
court granted the appeal and dismissed the complaint, noting cryp-
tically that the claim was not "cognizable" before it.124 Despite the
enigmatic disclaimer, the people of Rhode Island regarded the court
as having declared the act unconstitutional. The legislature thought
so too, for it summoned the judges before it for an explanation
which, once delivered, was both "highly technical"' 25 and wildly im-
probable. The judges explained that, although Weeden's plea had
been that the statute was void due to its repugnance to unwritten
fundamental law, they had merely decided that the claim was not
cognizable, without specifying the reasons for the defect.
"Whatever might have been the opinion of the Judges, they spoke
by their records, which admitted of no addition or diminution."' 26
The judges convinced nobody. The legislature refused to reappoint
them,' 27 the case was widely reported at the time as an example of
judicial review based on unwritten fundamental law,' 28 and even
Professor Crosskey, a vehement critic of judicial review, character-
ized the judges' explanation as "mask[ing] their actual action." 129
Once again, the case illustrates the Janus-like nature of judicial re-
view in the 1780s. Radical egalitarians denounced the thought of
judicial enforcement of fundamental law, whatever its source;
judges sought to preserve judicial review by indirection and obfus-
cation; and the people appreciated both the fact of the phenomenon
and its possibilities for preserving human liberty.
Bayard v. Singleton
A North Carolina statute authorized judges, acting without juries,
to determine title to property seized from loyalists and later sold.
Bayard brought suit in ejectment to recover certain confiscated
property and Singleton moved for dismissal of the action. The
court, "after pretty clearly intimating its belief that the act ... was
unconstitutional,"' 30 delayed its "decision for about a year and at-
tempted to secure a compromise which would avoid a conflict be-
123. See Varnum, supra note 86, at iv, xxi, quoted in HAINES, supra note 86, at 105-06.
124. CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 966.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 967 (quoting records of Rhode Island legislature).
127. Id. at 968.
128. Id. at 965-66.
129. Id. at 968.
130. Id. at 971.
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tween the law and the constitution."' 131 The court finally denied
Singleton's motion to dismiss, noting that "no act [the legislature]
could pass, could by any means repeal or alter the constitution,"' 3 2
and submitted the case to a jury, which promptly found for
Singleton.
Bayard is clearly an instance of the exercise of judicial review, al-
beit based upon a written provision of the North Carolina Constitu-'
tion. It is possible that the Bayard court might also have felt entitled,
in the proper case, to invalidate legislation as contrary to unwritten
fundamental law. 13 The North Carolina court was not called upon
to do so, however, and thus confined itself to enforcing the
supremacy of the written constitution. Like the other instances of
judicial review in the 1780s Bayard engendered substantial public
opposition, 3 4 reflecting the unsettled climate of political thought
and the transitional stage from radical legislative egalitarianism to
judicial constraint of the legislature.
The state precedents from the 1780s establish that judicial review
was employed haltingly, sparingly, and with knowledge that its use
would inspire popular opposition from dedicated radical egalitari-
ans. Sometimes, as in Philips's Case and Commonwealth v. Caton, judi-
cial review was claimed rhetorically but not sought to be enforced.
The remaining occasions discussed are all instances in which judicial
review was actually asserted, although in Rutgers v. Waddington and
Trevett v. Weeden the judges sought to deny or obscure their true ob-
ject. When lawyers urged judges to void legislation as repugnant to
fundamental law they were not careful to distinguish between writ-
ten and unwritten sources of fundamental law. Indeed, the actual
instances of judicial review reflect the advocates' haphazardness on
this point.' 35 Trevett v. Weeden and Rutgers v. Waddington are both ex-
amples of judicial review based on unwritten fundamental law,
Holmes v. Walton is an uncertain precedent, and Bayard v. Singleton is
rooted in the written constitution of North Carolina. All of the deci-
sions produced popular discontent from the disciples of radical
egalitarianism, yet the decisions have endured and were cited by
neo-Cokeans as examples of the judiciary's role as defender of
human liberty.
131. HAINES, supra note 86, at 113 (footnote omitted).
132. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 7 (1787).
133. See Sherry, supra note 5, at 1143.
134. CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 972-73.
135. James Whitman argued that this haphazardness was characteristic of the mingled
discourse of the age, one in which distinctions were not made between custom and
reason, or between natural law and positive law. See Whitman, supra note 16, at 1324-29.
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While some commentators treat the popular opposition to these
precedents as evidence that judicial review-whether grounded in
written or unwritten fundamental law-was certainly not accepted at
the time of the constitutional bargain in 1787,136 they overlook the
basic fact that the 17 80s were a time of-intense upheaval and transi-
tion. John Adams had declared that "the child independence was
born" by James Otis's invocation in 1760 of Coke and the power of
judicial review. 137 The sustenance of the newborn was, however,
radical egalitarianism embodied by the supreme legislature. That
experiment soured, and the 1780s represent the groping of revolu-
tionary America toward a political structure that sought to secure
revolutionary ideals in a more mature, sophisticated, and multi-di-
mensional fashion. The transition that occurred in that decade was
a blending of these revolutionary themes. Amid the fading bloom
of revolutionary radical egalitarianism it is not surprising to find
judges exercising the power of judicial review obliquely and tenta-
tively. Nor is it surprising that even such indirect attempts to curtail
legislative abuse were often greeted with public anger and resent-
ment. The outcome, which could be only dimly foreseen in the
1780s, was a fusion of radical egalitarianism with Cokean juris-
prudentialism. It is thus vain to pretend that, by reading the tea
leaves of the 1780s, we can be certain that any single aspect of those
transitional times was of such paramount importance that it ought
to be the rule of decision for today.
Judicial Review by State and Federal Courts after 1789
If the 1780s, leading up the 1787 Convention and resultant fed-
eral Constitution, were a time of tumultuous transition in political
thought, the period after 1789 produced a much clearer picture of
acceptance of both the idea ofjudicial review and its employment as
a device to insure the supremacy of both written and unwritten fun-
damental law. A brief review of some salient precedents will capture
the flavor of the period.
State Precedents
In Ham v. M'Claws,138 proceedings were brought to forfeit slaves
imported into South Carolina in violation of a South Carolina stat-
ute. The slaveowners conceded the statutory violation but con-
tended that, because they were induced to settle in South Carolina
136. See CROSSKEY, supra note 86, at 944-74; Michael, supra note 6, at 455-57.
137. 10 ADAMS, LIFE AND WORKS 248 (C.F. Adams ed., 1850), quoted in Corwin, supra
note 5, at 398.
138. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 38 (1789).
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in reliance upon then existing law, and could not possibly have
known of the recent alteration of the law, the statute should be re-
garded as contrary to "the rules of common right and justice."'1
3 9
Counsel argued quite specifically that "statutes made against natural
equity are void."' 140 The court agreed, charging the jury that "[i]t is
clear, that statutes passed against the plain and obvious principles of
common right and common reason, are absolutely void, as far as
they are calculated to operate against those principles."'14' The
court's embrace of Cokean principles of natural law and reason as
authority for invalidation of the statute could hardly have been
warmer.
In Kamper v. Hawkins,' 42 the Virginia Supreme Court concluded
that a Virginia act reorganizing judicial districts was void since it was
contrary to the Virginia Constitution. In seriatim opinions, the
court concluded that, where legislation and the Constitution col-
lided, it was the judicial duty "to decide that the act is void."'
43
Similarly, Spencer Roane "conclude[d] that the judiciary.., ought
to adjudge a law unconstitutional and void, if it be plainly repugnant
to the letter of the Constitution, or the fundamental principles
thereof.' 44 Lest there be any doubt about the relationship between
the written Constitution and the unwritten fundamental principles
appurtenant to constitutional text, Roane explained that fundamen-
tal principles were "those great principles growing out of the Con-
stitution ... ; those land-marks, which it may be necessary to resort
to, on account of the impossibility to foresee or provide for cases
within the spirit but without the letter of the Constitution."'' 45
In Bowman v. Middleton,146 a South Carolina statute transferring
title to real property from one party to another was invalidated since
"it was against common right.., to take away the freehold of one
man and vest it in another."' 47 Therefore, "the act was . . .void;
and ...no length of time could give it validity, being originally
founded on erroneous principles." 48 Once again the power of con-
139. Id. at 39.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 1 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 11 (1793).
143. Id. at 31 (Nelson, J.).
144. Id. at 40 (Roane, J.) (emphasis added).
145. Id. Speaking in similar tone were judges Henry, Tyler, and Tucker. See id. at 65-
66 ("[T]he law is unconstitutional ... and this opinion I form .. .from honest reason,
common sense, and the great letter of a Free Constitution.").
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stitutional judicial review was squarely related to the primacy of un-
written fundamental law.
To similar effect is Merrill v. Sherburne 149 in which the New Hamp-
shire courts struck down legislation which awarded a litigant a new
trial. The court concluded that the statute offended the New Hamp-
shire Constitution because it both usurped the judicial function and
was retrospective in its effect, but the court was sufficiently unsure
of the specific constitutional textual foundation for its conclusion
that it felt compelled to rest the decision "upon general
principles."'1
50
These state precedents are but the tip of the iceberg. Charles
Haines has collected another two dozen state precedents from the
period in which state courts declared legislation to be void as con-
trary to written constitutions or "against the law of nature."'' 1 It is
hardly surprising that Haines concluded that,
By a gradual development the American doctrine of judicial
review of legislation had emerged through colonial and state
precedents and dicta of judges into a fairly well understood
and accepted principle. Referring on some occasions to an
overruling law of nature, on other occasions to the fundamen-
tal principles embodied in the great English charters of liber-
ties, and, finally, to formally enacted written instruments,
colonial and state courts steadily asserted and maintained the
right to invalidate acts, and thus they promulgated for the
United States and put into an effective form Coke's theory of
the supremacy of the courts.
1 52
Federal Precedents
The contemporaneous federal precedents paint a similar picture.
Well before the power of judicial review was definitively claimed in
Marbury v. Madison,'53 the Supreme Court had indirectly asserted
the power and some of the lower federal courts had explicitly ruled
legislation invalid on constitutional grounds.
In Hayburn's Case,15 4 five of the six justices, in their capacities as
circuit justices, "rendered a decision for the first time holding an
149. 1 N.H. 199 (1818).
150. Id. at 211.
151. HAINES, supra note 86, at 168 (quoting Dupy v. Wickwire, I D. Chip. 237-39 (Vt.
1814)); see id. at 148-70 for discussion of these cases.
152. HAINES, supra note 86, at 169 (footnote omitted).
153. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
154. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). Though the justices decided the case in their various
capacities as circuit judges, they did not write opinions. Alexander Dallas's report is of
their letters to President Washington, explaining their refusal to decide. See also HAINES,
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Act of Congress to be in violation of the Constitution." 5 5 Congress
had enacted legislation which authorized pensions for disabled war
veterans. 156 The federal circuit courts were required to entertain
applications and to certify to the Secretary of War those applicants
found eligible. The Secretary, however, was free to disregard the
judicial finding of eligibility and substitute his own judgment of inel-
igibility. The justices informed President Washington that it was
impossible to entertain pension applications because (1) "the busi-
ness directed by this act is not of a judicial nature ... [and] the
courts ...must, consequently have proceeded without constitu-
tional authority," and (2) the power of the Secretary of War to re-
vise judicial findings was "radically inconsistent with the . .
important principle [of judicial independence] which is so strictly
observed by the Constitution of the United States."'
5 7
After the Eleventh Amendment overruled Chisholm v. Georgia '58 by
stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction over suits against states
brought by citizens of another state or country, the Supreme Court,
in Hollingsworth v. Virginia,159 dismissed all pending suits by citizens
of one state against another. Even though the Eleventh Amend-
ment had been ratified, § 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act continued to
authorize suits in federal court by citizens of one state against an-
other. 60 The Court's dismissal order, unaccompanied by an opin-
ion, effectively treated that portion of § 13 as invalid law due to the
supervening constitutional amendment. Accordingly, "Hollingsworth
may put to flight the conventional wisdom that Marbury v. Madison
was the first case in which the Supreme Court held an act of Con-
gress unconstitutional."' 16'
supra note 86, at 173-79; 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 69-80 (1922); Max Farrand, The First Hayburn Case, 1792, 13 AM. HIST. REV. 281
(1908).
155. 1 WARREN, supra note 154, at 69.
156. Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 243, 244 (repealed by Act of Feb. 28,
1793, ch. 17, § 1, 1 Stat. 324).
157. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 411. To similar effect is Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S.
(2 DalI.) 304 (C.C. Pa. 1795), in which Justice Paterson, riding circuit, charged a jury
"that there can be no doubt, that every Act of the Legislature, repugnant to the
Constitution, is absolutely void." Id. at 309. Justice Paterson made it quite clear that
this judicial power applied only to statutes offending the written Constitution. Id. at
308-10.
158. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
159. 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 378, 382 (1798).
160. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
161. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 22 (1985).
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In Hylton v. United States,' 6 2 a federal tax on carriages was attacked
as an unconstitutional unapportioned direct tax. The Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the validity of the tax by concluding that
it was not a direct tax, but was silent on the "threshold question
whether the Court had power to declare an act of Congress uncon-
stitutional .... Thus the Court began to accustom the country to
the fact of judicial review without proclaiming its power to exercise
it.",163
By the time John Marshall asserted the power in Marbu'y v.
Madison, its pedigree had already been well established. As Suzanna
Sherry has pointed out,' 64 Marshall's opinion in Marbury relied al-
most equally upon written and unwritten fundamental law to reach
the conclusion that a portion of § 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act was
repugnant to the Constitution. Having concluded that William Mar-
bury was entitled to his commission as a justice of the peace, Mar-
shall concluded that Marbury was also entitled to a remedy, not
because one had been given him by statute or the Constitution, but
because the provision of remedies for violations of rights was "the
very essence of civil liberty ... [and] [o]ne of the first duties of gov-
emnment. ' 165 Evidently, the lack of a positive law source of a rem-
edy would have violated some fundamental legal norm not to be
found in the Holy Writ of the Constitution. The specific constitu-
tional defect of § 13-the legislative authorization for the Court to
assume original jurisdiction of suits seeking mandamus "to any...
persons holding [federal] office"' 66 -was, however, an incongruity
between the written Constitution and the congressional act.
Marshall's acceptance of natural law as a component of constitu-
tional adjudication may be seen even more clearly in Fletcher v.
Peck.' 67 The 1795 Georgia legislature was bribed to convey vast
tracts of public land' 68 for less than two cents per acre. The follow-
ing year a more virtuous legislature enacted legislation to cancel
these so-called "Yazoo land grants." Fletcher, a successor in inter-
est to an original Yazoo grantee, sued Peck, the immediate grantor,
for breach of the covenant of good title. Fletcher contended that,
162. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 172 (1796).
163. CURRIE, supra note 161, at 33. Justice Chase alone mentioned the issue, by
saying that he did not need to address it since he found the statute constitutional. 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) at 175.
164. Sherry, supra note 5, at 1169-70.
165. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803).
166. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 81.
167. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
168. The acreage in question consisted of most of present-day Alabama and
Mississippi.
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since the Yazoo grants had been lawfully rescinded, Peck was in
breach of his deed covenant.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Georgia legislature lacked
the constitutional power to rescind its conveyance. In an opinion
which "bristles with references suggesting unwritten limitations de-
rived from natural law"' 69 Marshall concluded that "Georgia was
restrained, either by general principles which are common to our
free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the constitution
of the United States,"' 70 from revoking the Yazoo grants. Justice
William Johnson, concurring specially on this point, was even
blunter: "I do it, on a general principle, on the reason and nature of
things: a principle which will impose laws even on the Deity.''
l
All of this was evocative of Justice Samuel Chase's celebrated en-
dorsement, in Calder v. Bull,172 of natural law as a principle by which
judges may void legislation: "There are certain vital principles in
our free republican governments, which will determine and overrule
an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power .... An act of
the legislature (for I cannot call it a law), contrary to the great first
principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful ex-
ercise of legislative authority."17
The early federal period is thus replete with cases which docu-
ment the steady trend toward rejection of revolutionary-era legisla-
tive supremacy and return to the earlier idea that Cokean
jurisprudentialism was a preferred method by which to assure the
continuation of individual rights. 174 In the course of this develop-
ment, the cases rely upon both written and unwritten fundamental
law as a basis upon which to void legislation. That fact is reflective
of a continuation in the early federal period of the revolutionary dis-
course that mingled together custom and reason, written and un-
written law, as sources of fundamental law.
169. CURRIE, supra note 161, at 130.
170. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139. Marshall's invocation of natural law was not unique to
Fletcher v. Peck. In Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), Marshall
unequivocally asserted that contractual rights were pre-political natural rights:
"[I]ndividuals do not derive from government their right to contract, but bring that
right with them into society." Id. at 346.
171. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 143.
172. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
173. Id. at 388. Some devout positivists, likeJohn Ely, have contended that Chase did
not mean by this passage to embrace unwritten fundamental law as a judicially
enforceable limit on legislation. See ELY, supra note 1, at 210-11. Other skeptics of
natural law, such as David Currie, are convinced that Chase did, indeed, endorse natural
law as a limiting principle. See CURRIE, supra note 161, at 46.
174. Charles Haines, for example, described Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison
as having "asserted Coke's theory ofjudicial supremacy." HAINES, supra note 86, at 202.
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To be sure, reliance upon unwritten law was a source of some
controversy, symbolized by the famous debate between Samuel
Chase and William Iredell over the proper role of natural law in
constitutional adjudication. Justice Iredell contended that judges
could not void legislation "merely because it is, in their judgment,
contrary to the principles of natural justice." 17 5 Iredell objected to
natural law because "ideas of natural justice are regulated by no
fixed standard."' 76 While that objection might also be levelled
against the written Constitution as well, Iredell also thought that the
very idea ofjudicially enforceable unwritten limits on legislation was
fundamentally incompatible with the concept of a written
constitution.
The 1787 Convention did not draft a written constitution which
simply restated the existing understanding of fundamental law.
Rather, they deliberately set out to create a new statement of funda-
mental legal principles, with no pedigree in history or experience,
the validity of which was entirely grounded in the fact that it was a
charter adopted by the people through their representatives in the
ratification conventions. Though Iredell did not explicitly say so,
his view that a written constitution wholly displaces unwritten
sources of fundamental law must have stemmed from a belief that
the only form of fundamental law was that which was adopted by the
people. If Iredell did entertain such a view of popular sovereignty,
it was one which comported uneasily with the Lockean political the-
ory that actuated much of revolutionary political thought.
Locke and Iredell would no doubt agree that "law becomes bind-
ing solely because of the people's consent."' 177 A central aspect of
Locke's vision was "that the sovereign merely succeeded to the pri-
vate rights given up to it by the contracting individual members of
society."' 78 By assuming, as Iredell did, that the written Constitu-
tion delivered to the sovereign power to invade every aspect of
human behavior except where written limits were specified, Iredell
stood Lockean theory on its head. Lockeans thought that "the state
itself had no claim to new and independent rights as against the per-
son under its control,"'179 but derived its powers from explicit ces-
sions from the people. While a written constitution might be the
definitive instrument for determining the limits of that cession, it
could not be the final authority regarding the limits of the people's
175. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399.
176. Id.
177. Michael, supra note 6, at 457.
178. Massey, Fundamental Rights, supra note 8, at 315.
179. Id.
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rights, for Lockean thought posited that "government powers are
islands in a sea of individual rights, not the sea encompassing is-
lands of enumerated liberties." 180 Iredell and modern commenta-
tors who deny utterly the existence of unenumerated rights fall into
the error of supposing that, since the Constitution defines the ex-
tent of governmental power, it must also define the limits of re-
tained individual liberties immune from the exercise of
governmental power. The one does not follow from the other. The
lively presence of natural law thought in constitutional adjudication
during the post-revolutionary period is proof that Iredell's error was
not uniformly shared. Of course, over time the blandishments of
positivism have captured the legal imagination and natural law has
had to live a fugitive existence. Nevertheless, the continued persis-
tence of natural law thought in constitutional adjudication, under
whatever guise, suggests that we implicitly realize the error of the
Iredell position.
The Ninth Amendment is a logical textual home for the natural
law element of constitutional adjudication. Some originalists con-
tend that such a function is improper because it was never intended
to perform that role. Without conceding that the original intentions
of the framers must necessarily control today, I contend that the
Ninth Amendment was designed to perform multiple functions, in-
cluding the preservation of unwritten fundamental rights of the peo-
ple from governmental invasion.
THE INTENDED PURPOSES OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
In debating the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the Ninth
Amendment, most commentators assume that there was only one
intended purpose for the amendment. The nature of the debate
then becomes an exercise in invoking historical sources in an at-
tempt to demonstrate that any given view of the Ninth Amendment
is the most plausible one to attribute to the framers. There are at
least two fundamental errors in any "single-purpose" approach: it
ignores the multi-faceted and contradictory political theory which
influenced the framers' efforts, and it provides a poorer account for
the entire historical record than does the approach that assigns mul-
tiple objectives to the Ninth Amendment.
The 1787 Constitutional Convention occurred because the imme-
diate post-revolutionary embrace of radical democratic egalitarian-
180. Massey, supra note 13, at 1265. The metaphor is Stephen Macedo's. See STEPHEN
MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION 27 (1986).
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ism centered in the state governments was not working. 8 1 Virtually
all the national leaders, including many men who would become
Anti-Federalists, agreed that the need for free trade, servicing the
public debt, and providing for such common needs as defense, de-
manded a significantly stronger central government. 82 As a result,
the Convention delegates were more commonly beset by fears of
state encroachment upon national power than fears of federal dis-
placement of state power. Despite this attitude, the Framers were
not indifferent to the possibility that the new central government
would abuse its powers. Accordingly, they employed a number of
familiar structural devices both to disperse power among the
branches of government and to check its exercise in order to pre-
vent the "accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and ju-
diciary, in the same hands . . . [for this] may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny."'
8
An equally indispensable device for the preservation of liberty
was the preservation of the independent status of the states.
Madison argued that one advantage of the new Constitution was
that "the federal and state governments... [would possess] the dis-
position and the faculty ... to resist and frustrate the measures or
each other."'' 8 4 To curb "ambitious encroachments of the federal
government[] on the authority of the State governments"' 8 5 the
Framers created structures by which the central government was
forced to depend upon the states for its very existence.' 8 6 To facili-
tate further the independence of the states, the central government
was granted a "few and defined" number of powers, while the states
retained power over "all the objects, which, in the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people."'
8 7
181. See generally McDONALD, supra note 14, at 143-83 (describing period of 1776-87);
WOOD, supra note 14, at 393-429 (describing political climate leading to Constitutional
Convention).
182. See HERBERT A. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE For 24-32 (1981),
for a most thoughtful survey of the Anti-Federalists' view of the need for a stronger
central government. Storing argued that the Anti-Federalists were divided on this point,
but even those who accepted the need for a stronger central government did so only
with respect to limited purposes, such as national defense.
183. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 245-46 Uames Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
184. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 240 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
185. Id. at 242.
186. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 236 (James Madison) (Max Beloffed., 1987).
These devices included state control over the qualifications of voters, the election of
senators by state legislatures, and the use of the electoral college or voting by state
within the House of Representatives to elect the president.
187. Id. at 237-38.
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Thus, the framers expected "that the protection of citizen rights
... [would] be governed by state constitutional law." 1 88 This is not
surprising, for the framers regarded sovereignty as resting ulti-
mately with the people, and recognized that the people of each state
had been careful to create structures by which written and unwritten
fundamental law would be enforced to limit the illegitimate pre-
tenses of the people's legislative agents. Because of the existence of
this principle, a "federal republic... of both national and state gov-
ernments was possible because the people, as the sovereign body,
were superior to each government and could determine the precise
amount of power allocated to each."'8 9 Accordingly, because the
federal and state governments were "different agents and trustees
of the people, instituted with different powers, and designated for
different purposes," 190 Madison and the Federalists saw no need for
an enumerated bill of rights, because the sovereign people had
made an explicit, and quite narrow, delegation of power to the cen-
tral government in the new Constitution.
The Anti-Federalists, however, did not see matters the same way.
George Mason unsuccessfully urged the Constitutional Convention
to adopt a Bill of Rights since, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, all
federal laws would be "paramount to State Bills of Rights."19 Ulti-
mately, of course, the lack of a bill of rights became "the chief rally-
ing point for the opponents to the Constitution during the
ratification debates."'
192
The principal objection to the proposed Constitution was that it
"would create an oppressive national government and destroy the
political authority of the states."' 93 To back up their charge, the
Anti-Federalists pointed to the "consolidated" nature of the pro-
188. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James Madison and
the Founders' Search for a Workable Balance Between Federal and State Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1261, 1272 (1989). Several delegates expressed this sentiment explicitly during
the 1787 Convention. It is recorded of Oliver Ellsworth that he trusted "for the
preservation of his rights to the State Govt. From these alone he could derive the
greatest happiness he expects in this life." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 492 (Max Ferrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter Convention Records]. Similarly,
Roger Sherman declared that a Bill of Rights was not necessary, because "[t]he State
Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution; and being in force are
sufficient." 2 id. at 588.
189. Wilmarth, supra note 188, at 1273.
190. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 239 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
191. 2 Convention Records, supra note 188, at 588 (George Mason speech of Sept. 12,
1787).
192. Wilmarth, supra note 188, at 1276; see also STORING, supra note 182, at 64-70.
"[Tlhe legacy of the Anti-Federalists was the Bill of Rights." Id. at 65.
193. Wilmarth, supra note 188, at 1276; STORING, supra note 182, at 15-23 (discussing
Anti-Federalist "belief that there was an inherent connection between the states and the
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posed central government, a government with sweeping legislative
and judicial powers and the authority to make its legislation
supreme-displacing in the process any contrary state statutory or
constitutional law. But because there were powerful practical rea-
sons to create a stronger central government than under the Articles
of Confederation, the Anti-Federalists "reluctant[ly] accept[ed] ...
the instrument provided that appropriate constitutional restraints
were placed upon the powers of the federal government."'1
94
The restraints deemed necessary were not only an enumeration of
individual liberties in the form of a bill of rights, but also a clear
statement "point[ing] out what powers were reserved to the state
governments, and clearly discriminat[ing] between [such powers]
and those which are given to the general government."' 95 Accord-
ingly, every one of the eight states whose ratification conventions
proposed amendments to the Constitution included an amendment
reserving to the states all unenumerated rights and powers.' 96
Federalists asserted reasonably enough that "any enumeration of
rights would necessarily be imperfect and would create the infer-
ence that no rights existed except those itemized."' 97 Indeed, dur-
ing the House of Representatives' debate of the Bill of Rights it was
asserted that the drafting "committee ... proceeded on the princi-
ple that these [enumerated] rights belonged to the people; they con-
ceived them to be inherent." 98 Representative Theodore Sedgwick
retorted that "if the committee were governed by that general prin-
ciple, they might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of
rights; they might have declared that a man should have a right to
wear his hat if he please; that he might get up when he pleased, and
to go to bed when he thought proper."' 99 Sedgwick thought that it
was pointless to attempt to itemize every "self-evident, unalienable
right which the people possess" 200 since most such rights "never
preservation of human liberty.... [since] states ... are the natural homes of individual
liberty.").
194. Wilmarth, supra note 188, at 1281; STORING, supra note 182, at 24-37 (discussing
qualified acceptance by Anti-Federalists of stronger central government).
195. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 271 (George Mason speech of June 11,
1788 in Virginia convention); see also 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
793 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) [hereinafter "BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY"].
196. See 2 BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY, supra note 195, at 665-66 (Pennsylvania); id. at
712 (Massachusetts); id. at 732 (Maryland); id. at 757 (South Carolina); id. at 760 (New
Hampshire); id. at 842 (Virginia); id. at 911-12 (New York); id. at 968 (North Carolina).
197. Massey, Fundamental Rights, supra note 8, at 309.
198. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731-32 (Joseph Gales & W. Seaton eds., 1789) (remarks of
Rep. Benson) [hereinafter ANNALS OF CONG.].
199. Id. at 732.
200. Id. at 731.
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would be called into question," 20 ' nor were such rights "intended to
be infringed" by the new Constitution.202 Implicit in this argument
was the view that "inherent liberty rights retained by the people are
unenumerable because the human imagination is limitless. °2 0
3
Moreover, the enumeration of certain rights carried with it the
danger that "by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of
power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the
hands of the General Government, and were consequently inse-
cure." 20 4 Thus, it was preferable to enumerate imperfectly "the
powers of the federal government with the implication that powers
not enumerated were reserved to the people, than to attempt an
imperfect enumeration of rights reserved to the people, with the im-
plication that rights not so reserved where impliedly delegated to
the federal government."
205
Even though Anti-Federalists responded to the Federalist argu-
ment by contending that the enumeration of federal government
powers was already unbounded,20 6 arguing that the unamended
Constitution itself had committed the evil of a partial enumeration
of rights,20 7 and expressing reservations over whether an incom-
plete enumeration of rights could be overcome by a declaration that
201. Id.
202. Id. at 732.
203. Randy E. Barnett, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV.
J.L. & PuB. PoL'v 615, 628 (1991).
204. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 198, at 439 (Rep. Madison).
205. Massey, Fundamental Rights, supra note 8, at 309; see also Wilmarth, supra note 188,
at 1285. To similar effect were James Wilson's remarks during the Pennsylvania
ratification convention:
[A]n imperfect enumeration [of rights] would throw all implied power
into the scale of the government, and the rights of the people would be
rendered incomplete. On the other hand, an imperfect enumeration of
the powers of government reserves all implied power to the people ....
But of the two .... an omission in the enumeration of the powers of
government is neither so dangerous nor important as an omission in the
enumeration of the rights of the people.
2 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 97, at 436-37.
206. Anti-Federalists were quick to refer to the General Welfare and Necessary and
Proper Clauses in the Constitution as heads of unbounded power. Anti-Federalists
would be dismayed, but not surprised, at the present extent of such other heads of
federal legislative authority as the commerce clause. Cf Richard A. Epstein, The Proper
Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987) (criticizing twentieth century
expansion of commerce clause).
207. Indeed, the Constitution had enumerated such rights as the right to jury trial in
criminal cases, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, the right to habeas corpus, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, and the prohibition of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. Id.
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"all rights are reserved... which are not expressly surrendered, °" 2 0 8
the effort to enumerate rights proceeded to fruition. One key to the
success of the effort, however, was the inclusion of what ultimately
became the Ninth Amendment.
In the course of his effort to guide the Bill of Rights through the
First Congress, James Madison proposed that the enumeration of
specific rights in the Constitution "shall not be construed as to di-
minish the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or
as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as
actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution." 20 9 Madison explained that the proposal was designed to
"guard[] against ... [the] implication that those rights which were
not [enumerated] were intended to be assigned into the hands of
the General Government." 21 0 In making this argument, Madison
echoed James Wilson's earlier contention to the Pennsylvania ratifi-
cation convention that, by enumerating rights, "everything that is
not enumerated is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that
an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the
scale of government; and the rights of the people would be ren-
dered incomplete."
'12 1 1
There are two aspects to the argument. One is the view that,
since the new central government was a government of limited and
enumerated powers, any attempt to enumerate rights which were
immune from the exercise of those powers carried with it an un-
wanted implication that the central government possessed implied
authority to invade these rights, else the enumeration would not
have been necessary. On this view, the function of the Ninth
Amendment was to rebut that inference and negate any attempt to
enlarge the enumerated and delegated powers of the central gov-
ernment.2 1 2 A different aspect of the Madison-Wilson argument is
208. Letter XVI from THE FEDERAL FARMER (Jan. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ArT-FEDERALIST 324 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
209. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 198, at 435 (remarks ofJames Madison on June 8,
1789); 2 BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY, supra note 195, at 1027.
210. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 198, at 439 (remarks of Rep. Madison).
211. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 97, at'436 (Oct. 28, 1787).
212. This is the straightforward reading of McAffee's argument. See supra note 11.
Although the thrust of McAffee's argument is as stated, at several points he attributed to
the Ninth Amendment a crabbed application that his materials do not support. McAffee
made the claim that the Ninth Amendment "says nothing about how to construe the
powers of Congress or how broadly to read the doctrine of implied powers; it indicates
only that no inference about those powers should be drawn from the mere fact that
rights are enumerated in the Bill of Rights." McAffee, supra note 11, at 1300 n.325.
Similarly, he argued that "the ninth amendment serves the unique function of
safeguarding the system of enumerated powers against a particular threat arguably
presented by the enumeration of limitations on national power .... If the government
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the view that any enumeration of rights, necessarily being imperfect,
would carry with it the implication that rights not enumerated are
fair game for elimination by the new government. Speaking at the
North Carolina ratification convention, James Iredell declared that,
it would not only be useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a
number of rights which were not intended to be given up; be-
cause it would be implying, in the strongest manner, that every right not
included in the exception might be impaired by the government without
usurpation; and it would be impossible to enumerate every one.
Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he
pleases, I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more
rights not contained in it.213
contended in a particular case that it held a general power to regulate the press as an
appropriate inference from the first amendment restriction on that power.., the ninth
amendment would provide a direct refutation." Id. at 1306-07 (emphasis added).
McAffee added that the fact "[tihat such arguments have never been made is a testimony
perhaps to the efficacy of the ninth amendment, or perhaps to the speciousness of the
original concern." Id. at 1307.
But such arguments have been made, and McAffee overlooked them. In the Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870), Justice Strong, writing for the Court,
argued that adoption of the Bill of Rights "tend[s] plainly to show that, in the judgment
of those who adopted the Constitution, there were powers created by it, neither
expressly specified nor deducible from any one specified power, or ancillary to it alone,
but which grew out of the aggregate of powers conferred upon the government, or out
of the sovereignty instituted." Id. at 535. Justice Strong illustrated this general
principle by noting that,
[t]he power to suspend ... [habeas corpus] is not expressly given, nor
can it be deduced from any of the particularized grants of power. Yet it is
provided that . . . [habeas corpus] shall not be suspended except in
certain defined contingencies. This is no express grant of power. It is a
restriction. But it shows irresistibly that somewhere in the Constitution
power to suspend . . .[habeas corpus] was granted ....
Id. at 534. If McAffee is correct that the Ninth Amendment has only the narrow applica-
tion he attributed to it, this is the very instance in which it applies, yet neither Justice
Strong nor any of his cohorts even alluded to the Ninth Amendment.
Moreover, McAffee overlooked completely Madison's argument in the House of Rep-
resentatives that Congress lacked any power, implied from its enumerated powers, to
charter a national bank. Madison contended that "[tihe latitude of interpretation re-
quired by the [bank] bill is condemned by the rule furnished by the Constitution itself,
instantiated [in the Ninth Amendment] ... as guarding against a latitude of interpreta-
tion [of the enumerated powers of Congress]." 2 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 198, at
1899, 1901 (statement of Rep. Madison); see also Barnett, supra note 203, at 635-39.
Since McAffee relied so heavily upon Madison in other respects it is curious indeed why
this direct refutation by Madison of McAffee's crabbed reading of the Ninth Amendment
should go wholly unmentioned.
213. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 167 (July 29, 1788) (emphasis added).
Some might contend that using Iredell as authority for the proposition that the Ninth
Amendment secures unenumerated rights from governmental encroachment is curious,
given Iredell's noted positivism. There are two answers to the charge. First, Iredell was
never called upon to consider a claim that Ninth Amendment rights are as much a part
of the written Constitution as any enumerated right. Enforcement of such rights is
consistent with Iredell's view, expressed in Calder v. Bull, that judges were entitled to
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On this view, unenumerated rights would be endangered, not from
some enhanced implied power of government, but simply because
the new government, using its conceded powers, could argue that
the right in question, not being enumerated, is no right at all.2 14
The surprise is that these two views should seemingly be regarded
as mutually exclusive.215 Both views are directed toward a common
end-the more effectual securing of human liberty from govern-
mental encroachment. Because governments can invade liberty
both by illegitimately claiming enlarged powers and by using admit-
ted powers to invade long-recognized and well-understood rights
that seemed so obvious as not to require a statement of their exist-
ence, the more logical explanation is that the framers realized this
duality and thought the Ninth Amendment would deal with both
problems. Moreover, by starting from the proposition that the
Ninth Amendment was designed to serve both of these objectives,
better sense can be made of the historical evidence.
During the Virginia debate on ratification of the Bill of Rights,
Hardin Burnley informed James Madison by letter that Edmund
Randolph had professed displeasure with the Ninth Amendment be-
cause "there was no criterion by which it could be determined
whether any particular [unenumerated] right was retained or
not.... [Randolph preferred] that this reservation against construc-
tive power, should operate rather as a provision against extending
the powers of Congress by their own authority, than as a reservation
of rights reducible to no definitive certainty." 216 Burnley added that
he did not see "the force of the distinction, for by preventing an
enforce only the written Constitution. Alternatively, it is possible (though implausible)
that Iredell simply changed his mind between the 1788 North Carolina ratification
convention and his later opinion in Calder v. Bull.
214. Perhaps the most eloquent spokesman for this view is Randy Barnett. See Randy
E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1988) [hereinafter
Barnett, Reconceiving]; Barnett, supra note 203.
215. McAffee, for example, was bold enough to assert that "[tihe combination of text,
context, and historical consensus . . . establishes [his residual rights view of] the
meaning of the ninth amendment as conclusively as it can for any constitutional
provision whose meaning is not self-evident on its face." McAffee, supra note 11, at
1318. John Hart Ely, on the other hand, contended that, by the Ninth Amendment,
Madison "wished to forestall both the implication of unexpressed powers and the
disparagement of unenumerated rights." ELY, supra note 1, at 36. Randy Barnett
recognized that while James Madison might have recognized "two conceptual strategies
for accomplishing a single objective" of preserving retained rights-preventing the
accretion of congressional power by implication and providing a source of judicially
enforceable unenumerated individual rights-he was committed to the latter strategy.
Barnett, Reconceiving , supra note 214, at 16.
216. 2 BILL OF RiGrrs HISTORY, supra note 195, at 1188 (letter from Hardin Burnley
to James Madison, dated Nov. 28, 1789, in which Burnley attributed these sentiments to
Randolph).
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extension of power in [Congress] safety will be insured . . . [and
also] by protecting the rights of the people ... an improper exten-
sion of power will be prevented & safety made equally certain."21 7
Madison repeated the gist of Burnley's summary of Randolph's
objections in a letter to George Washington. Madison declared that
Randolph's distinction between a "reservation against constructive
power," on the one hand, and a "reservation of rights reducible to
no definitive certainty," 21 8 on the other hand, was "altogether fanci-
ful. If a line can be drawn between the powers granted and the
rights retained, it would seem to be the same thing, whether the
latter be secured by declaring that they shall not be abridged, or
that the former shall not be extended. If no such line can be drawn,
a declaration in either form would amount to nothing." 219 It seems
quite obvious that Madison thought that cabining powers and re-
serving rights were simply two avenues to the same destination.
Moreover, it appears reasonably clear that Madison thought the two
approaches were equally efficacious. 220 As John Ely has observed,
217. Id.
218. Id. (letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison, dated Nov. 28, 1789).
McAffee argued that the distinction drawn by Randolph was between the Ninth
Amendment and its Virginia predecessors, the first and seventeenth amendments
proposed by the Virginia ratification convention. McAffee, supra note 11, at 1292. Yet,
the context in which the distinction was drawn-in both Burnley's and Madison's
letters-was always one in which the amendment's function as a means to limit
extensions of congressional power was contrasted with its function as a reservation of
individual rights. McAffee's purported distinction is helpful to bolster his argument that
everyone involved thought the Ninth Amendment's sole function was to cabin powers,
but, in the context of the actual correspondence in which the term is used, McAffee's
construction appears to be based on shadows in the gloaming.
219. Id. at 1189, 1190 (Letter from Madison to George Washington, Dec. 5, 1789); see
also 5 THE WRrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 431-32 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904).
220. A slightly different construction of Madison's argument is that he meant that, for
individual rights to be secure from governmental invasion, it would be necessary for
both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to constrain the powers of the newly established
central government. See Barnett, Reconceiving, supra note 214, at 15-16; Massey, supra
note 13, at 1239. The failure of either to do so would be inimical to the preservation of
a zone of individual autonomy where governments could not intrude. Given that
Madison conceived of the Ninth Amendment as performing both a power limiting and
rights enhancing role there is no dissonance in supposing that the Tenth Amendment
was designed to augment the Ninth Amendment's power limiting role.
This view is supported by Madison's correspondent, Hardin Burnley. Burnley
believed that "the supporters of the Bill of Rights in the Virginia legislature deemed both
the ninth and tenth amendments to be essential in order to assure the efficacy of the
previous amendments." Wilmarth, supra note 188, at 1302. Thus, "[t]he Burnley-
Madison letters confirm that the ninth and tenth amendments were intended to operate
in tandem to protect the unenumerated rights of the people and the unenumerated
powers of. the states against federal encroachment." Id.; see also Barnett, Reconceiving,
supra note 214, at 4-16 (arguing Ninth Amendment, as well as Tenth Amendment, bars
extension of federal powers through unwarranted implication and limits the means of
exercising such powers); Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on
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in this latter aspect of his argument, Madison made "what we would
today regard as a category mistake, a failure to recognize that rights
and powers are not simply the absence of one another but that
rights can cut across or 'trump' powers."
22'
Moreover, when in the nineteenth century newly admitted Ameri-
can states crafted their own constitutions, they typically added a
Ninth Amendment of their own to their constitutions.22 2 It is hard
to understand why any group of state constitution makers would
have done so if they had thought the Ninth Amendment was simply
a device to cabin federal legislative power. The clear inference is
that the understanding of the Ninth Amendment in 1819, for exam-
ple, when Maine and Alabama adopted constitutions, was that it pre-
served individual rights as well as preventing unwarranted accretion
to federal legislative power. 223
If the Ninth Amendment was designed, in part, to preserve
unenumerated individual rights from federal invasion, it is necessary
to specify how those rights are to be located. There are two princi-
pal sources: natural law and state constitutions. I will not belabor
the contention that state constitutions may serve as a source of inde-
pendently enforceable federal constitutional rights; 224 rather my
the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1987) [hereinafter Bork Hearings] (stating that "ninth
amendment may be a direct counterpart to the 10th amendment").
221. ELY, supra note 1, at 36 (footnote omitted).
222. See the constitutions of Alabama (1819), 1 Thorpe, supra note 76, at 98; Arkansas
(1836), id. at 270-71; California (1849), id. at 392; Colorado (1876), id. at 478; Florida
(1885), 2 id. at 734; Georgia (1865), id. at 811; Iowa (1846), id. at 1125; Kansas (1855),
id. at 1181; Louisiana (1868), 3 id. at 1450; Maine (1819), id. at 1649; Maryland (1851),
id. at 1716; Minnesota (1857), 4 id. at 1993; Mississippi (1868), id. at 2071; Missouri
(1875), id. at 2232; Montana (1889), id at 2304; Nebraska (1866-67), id. at 2351; Nevada
(1864), id. at 2404; New Jersey (1844), 5 id. at 2600; North Carolina (1868), id. at 2803;
Ohio (1851), id. at 2915; Oregon (1857), id. at 3000; Rhode Island (1842), 6 id. at 3224;
South Carolina (1868), id. at 3285; Virginia (1870), 7 id. at 3875; Washington (1889), id.
at 3975; Wyoming (1889), id. at 4120.
223. Five states recognized that the Ninth Amendment preserved the dual role of
cabining powers and preserving individual rights, for they expressly separated the two
principles in their constitutions. See the constitutions of Kansas (1855), 2 id. at 1181;
Nebraska (1866-67), 4 id. at 2351; North Carolina (1868), 5 id. at 2803; Ohio (1851), id.
at 2915; and South Carolina (1868), 6 id. at 3285.
224. See Massey, supra note 13, for a fuller exploration of state constitutions as
sources of Ninth Amendment rights. Other commentators agree as to the legitimacy of
the source if not the implications I have drawn. See Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment:
The Beckoning Mirage, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 951, 956 (1990) (arguing Ninth Amendment
"was designed to limit federal powers . . . [by preventing] any exercise of power which
may endanger the states .... "); Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 73 VA. L. REV. 223, 265 (1983) ("the ninth amendment embraces those
individual liberties protected by state laws"); Wilmarth, supra note 188, at 1297-98 ("the
ninth amendment was originally intended to allow the people of each state to define
unenumerated rights under their own constitution and laws, free from federal
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focus here is upon the natural law component of Ninth Amendment
rights. But before turning to the difficult problem of constructing a
method by which judges can locate such rights without resort to
sheer personal preference, it is necessary to dispose of the contem-
porary significance of the argument that the sole intended function
of the Ninth Amendment was to eliminate the possibility that an
enumeration of rights would furnish justification for Congress to
seize additional, and implied, powers.
THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "POWER-LIMITING"
ROLE OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
Even if one were to grant the validity of the argument that the
Ninth Amendment was intended to perform only the role of
preventing the extension of federal legislative power by implication,
and even if we were to concede the even more debatable point that
in the course of contemporary constitutional interpretation we are
obligated to effectuate the framers' intent, it by no means follows
that we are compelled to regard the Ninth Amendment as simply a
judicially unenforceable structural limit upon congressional power.
After two centuries of constitutional development, we no longer
make any serious attempt to control the extent of the implied pow-
ers of Congress. If the Ninth Amendment's original intent was to
provide a rule of construction by which claims of implied congres-
sional power would be greeted skeptically, that function has been
irretrievably eclipsed by the awesome breadth of contemporary fed-
eral power.
To preserve its original function, it is necessary to apply to the
Ninth Amendment a sort of constitutional cy pres doctrine. When
faced with the problem of an expressed testamentary intent that is
impossible to achieve, courts seek to effectuate as nearly as possible
the testator's intent. Similarly, if the Ninth Amendment's intended
purpose was simply to confine the extent of congressional power by
preventing a latitudinarian interpretation of the scope of that
power, it is evident that, apart from a radical reconstruction of ex-
isting doctrine, that intent can no longer be accomplished. To effec-
tuate the original intent as near as possible it is necessary to
constrain governmental power by reading the Ninth Amendment as
interference"); Bork Hearings, supra note 220, at 249, 290 ("I think the ninth amendment
says that, like powers, the enumeration of rights shall not be construed to deny or
disparage rights retained by the people in their State Constitutions. That is the best I can do
with it.... [lit is a little hard to know what category of rights, if any, were supposed to
be preserved by the ninth amendment unless it is the state constitutional rights.")
(testimony of Judge Bork) (emphasis added).
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a source of judicially enforceable individual rights which operate to
limit the exercise of governmental power.
The notion of "constitutional cy pres" is not without precedent.
By prohibiting states from making or enforcing "any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States," the creators of the Fourteenth Amendment intended "to
embrace [the rights] .. .guaranteed by the first eight amendments
and other basic liberties . "..."225 Of course, those intentions were
promptly throttled by the Slaughter-House Cases,226 in which the
Supreme Court assigned to the Privileges and Immunities Clause
the role of protecting only the rights of national citizenship, and
then proceeded to treat all the important and fundamental rights of
citizenship as aspects of state citizenship, ultimately "left to the un-
fettered discretion of the local governments." 227 Given the lack of
will to overturn directly the Slaughter-House decision, the intentions
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause have proven impossible to
implement. In a de facto application of constitutional cy pres, the
Court has given an expansive reading to the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to ac-
complish the intended purposes of the privileges and immunities
clause. The original desire to apply the Bill of Rights to the states
has been largely accomplished by the selective incorporation of vari-
ous guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause.
The Court's response to the desire to protect against state invasion
"fundamental right[s] which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments" 228 has been to read into the Due Process Clause
225. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 180 (1956).
Representative Jonathan Bingham, the architect of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, expressly declared that "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States as contradistinguished from the citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the first
eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess., App. 85 (1871). Bingham also pointed to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of article IV as his model. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. part 2, 1033-34
(1866). In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230),Justice
Washington, on circuit duty, determined that the article IV clause protected privileges
"which are, in their very nature fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments." Senator Howard relied directly on Corfield v. Coiyell to define the
content of the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and immunities and added that "[t]o
these... should be added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight
amendments of the Constitution." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2765 (1866).
For contrary views of the Fourteenth Amendment's origins, see RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
226. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
227. Lucile Lomen, Privileges and Immunities Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 WASH. L.
REV. 120, 124 (1943).
228. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
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protection for certain implied fundamental rights, like privacy, and
to subject state infringements of fundamental rights to the most
stringent judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
There are three major ways in which constitutional cy pres can be
applied to the Ninth Amendment. The amendment can be seen as
securing against federal invasion individual rights having their ori-
gin in state constitutions.2 2 9 The amendment can be read as "a rule
of interpretation ... [that] acts as a presumption in favor of genera-
lizing" 2 0 about the scope of explicit constitutional terms in order to
protect unenumerated "rights which are consistent with the enumer-
ated rights." 231 Finally, the amendment can be treated as an admo-
nition to locate and enforce rights having their origin in natural law.
The Anti-Federalist Function
To read plausibly the Ninth Amendment as protecting individual
rights having their origin in state constitutions, it is necessary to
consider the symbiotic relationship between the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. The Tenth Amendment, regarded today as a truism
that the states retain those powers not delegated to the central gov-
ernment, was intended to complement the power limiting aspect of
the Ninth Amendment. If the Ninth Amendment was intended in
part to prevent the accretion of federal power by implication from
the fact of enumerated rights exempt from that power, the Tenth
Amendment was designed to prevent the accretion of federal power
by implication from any other source in the Constitution.
Some evidence of this parallel intent may be found in the congres-
sional modification of the Tenth Amendment by which the phrase
"or to the people" was added.232 This phrase provides a linguistic
parallel to Ninth Amendment rights for Tenth Amendment powers.
Without the change, the Ninth Amendment would have operated to
secure the unenumerated rights "retained by the people," while the
Tenth Amendment would have simply preserved the residual pow-
ers to the states alone. By adding the phrase "or to the people" the
Tenth Amendment makes plain that the people, as ultimate sover-
229. This is the subject of Massey, supra note 13.
230. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 54, 111
(1991).
231. Id. at 110.
232. See I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 198, at 790; 2 BILL OF RIGHTS HISTORY, supra
note 195, at 1118 (House of Representatives debates of Aug. 18, 1789). Though the
debates provide no certain reason for the change, the phrase was probably added to
underscore the theme that "ultimate authority... resides in the people alone..." and
that "[t]he federal and state governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of
the people." THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 239 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
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eigns, retain both unenumerated individual rights and the residual
powers of government, which may or may not be vested by them in
their state governmental agents. 23 3 The two amendments were con-
ceived as a tandem device by which the sovereign people manifested
their residual sovereignty. By the Ninth Amendment, the people re-
tained their unenumerated rights; by the Tenth Amendment, they
retained the non-delegated and unprohibited powers.
Both amendments were intended to preserve to the people of the
states the sovereign's prerogative to confer powers upon their state
governmental agents (recognized in the Tenth Amendment) and to
create individual rights secure from governmental invasion (recog-
nized in the Ninth Amendment). The intended medium for doing
so, in both cases, was the state constitution. The Ninth Amendment
recognizes that individual rights stemming from a source other than
enumeration in the federal Constitution may, nevertheless, not be
treated any differently from individual rights which are expressly
enumerated in the federal Constitution. Both types of rights are en-
titled to parity of treatment under the federal Constitution; Con-
gress is effectively disabled from infringing either type. The Tenth
Amendment "simply recognizes that the people of the states and
their state governmental agents retain residual authority to act in
the shade of federal powers. Thus, the ninth amendment creates
federal rights, independent barriers to federal action, while the
tenth amendment recognizes the existence of concurrent state pow-
ers beyond the frontier of federal power." 23 4 The implications of
this view to state constitutional law and the powers of Congress are
beyond the scope of this paper and have been treated elsewhere. 23 5
The "Rule of Interpretation" Function
This view, suggested by Laurence Tribe, is based on the assump-
tion that "[t]he Ninth Amendment tells interpreters of the Constitu-
tion how not to 'construe' that document." 23 6 Like McAffee, Tribe
took the position that the Ninth Amendment was designed to pre-
vent "the argument that [claimed] rights are not there just because
233. Justice Joseph Story, the most influential early constitutional commentator,
interpreted the phrase "or to the people" to mean that "what is not conferred [to the
national government], is withheld, and belongs to the state authorities, if invested by their
constitutions of government respectively in them; and if not so invested, it is retained by the
people, as a part of their residuary sovereignty." 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONsTITuTION OF THE UNITED STATES 752 (1970) (emphasis added).
234. Massey, supra note 13, at 1241.
235. Id.
236. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 230, at 110.
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they are not enumerated in the bill of Rights." 23 7 Tribe then "ar-
gue[d] that to make sense of the Ninth Amendment's proscriptive role
requires readers of the Constitution to assume that it also plays a
prescriptive role." 238 The prescriptive role urged by Tribe is to justify
a generous reading of the scope of the enumerated rights in the
Constitution. While this is a reasonable role for the Ninth Amend-
ment to perform in its reincarnation through constitutional cy pres, it
is one which need not be so limited. After all, the text of the Ninth
Amendment demands that the enumerated and unenumerated
rights be treated equally. If we reduce the Ninth Amendment to an
aid to construing the enumerated rights we have poorly served the
ideal of parity between the enumerated and unenumerated rights.
Of course, by giving explicit rights a wide scope we would, in effect,
be protecting implied or unenumerated rights. This is an approach
which has much to be said for it, but it is by no means mutually
exclusive from other remedial approaches and can be subsumed
within the natural law function.
The Natural Law Function
When the intellectual background of the colonial, revolutionary,
and post-revolutionary periods are recalled, it is difficult to dismiss
the influence of natural law on the creation of the Ninth Amend-
ment. Indeed, Roger Sherman's draft of the Bill of Rights expressly
declared that "[t]he people have certain natural rights which are re-
tained by them when they enter into Society." 239 Randy Barnett has
accurately described this as "reflect[ing] the sentiment that came to
be expressed in the Ninth [Amendment]. " 240 Thus, even if we grant
for the sake of argument that the sole function of the Ninth Amend-
ment was to prevent bloat of the powers delegated to Congress, the
framers' reason for selecting that purpose was because they re-
garded it as the most effective way of preserving the natural rights
which they had never ceded to the government they created. Since,
on this view, the framers labored under the misconception that
rights were simply the absence of powers it is crucial, now that we
know both that rights can trump powers and that the Ninth Amend-
ment has failed of its original purpose, to recreate the framers' vi-
sion by preserving directly the natural rights the framers sought to
preserve indirectly.
237. Id. at 54.
238. Id. at 111.
239. See THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 351 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
240. Id. at 7 n.16.
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It is not easy to do this in a world filled with skepticism about
whether there is any such thing as natural law. The object of the
balance of this article is to overcome that skepticism by describing
briefly what natural law is and is not, and by providing an account of
a principled method of locating natural rights judicially enforceable
through the Ninth Amendment.
THE LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF NATURAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION
"Human beings are apart from nature and a part of it. As human
beings, we are uniquely capable of reflecting on our experience and
formulating laws of our own governance .... As human beings, we
are subject to nature's laws." '241 Western conceptions of natural law
originated as an attempt to mediate this duality of the human condi-
tion. The Greeks posited that there was "a unitary normative natu-
ral order immanent in the cosmos, to which human beings adhere in
both their aspects." 242 Thus, events determined by the causal order
of nature are normatively prescribed, and events created by the
human agency of free will also fulfill the cosmic plan. In the thir-
teenth century Thomas Aquinas used the Greeks' structure of natu-
ral law but displaced nature with the Christian God. Natural law
thus became a divine law of eternal duration, "immanent in the cre-
ation, accessible to and binding on human beings."2 43
But as natural law wandered ever further from its theological
home it became a device "used to identify whatever was deemed
fundamental-that is, certain and non-negotiable." 244 As a conse-
quence "natural law was converted into natural rights, which meant
only that the rights in question were self-evident. ' 2 45 As the self-
evident nature of almost any proposition increasingly comes to be
doubted there is a corresponding increase in the skepticism with
which any claim of natural right is greeted.
Early theories of natural law were distinctly ontological; they
sought to explain the nature of being and, in particular, explain how
it is that human beings can be simultaneously part of the natural
order and free moral actors. Most modern theories of natural law
are distinctly deontological; they seek to explain the nature of obli-
gation and, in particular, explain the reasons why we can be obli-
gated to obey law. In so doing, modern natural law emphasizes the
241. LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 1 (1987).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 2.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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moral component of law, insisting that for "law" to be law it must
correspond to the prepolitical demands of morality. In contrast, the
dominant mode of contemporary legal thought, legal positivism,
holds that "it is no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or
satisfy certain demands of morality."2 46 The problem with almost
all modern deontological theories of natural law is that they are un-
able to convince us that there is an objectively valid moral order, or
at least one which we can identify.2 47 Ontological theories of natu-
ral law are no more convincing, at least when they begin to describe
the particular normative natural order they claim exists.
Western society is deeply divided between moral skeptics and
moral realists. Whether that fact is deplorable or cause for rejoicing
is a judgment that need not be made here, but it is a fact with con-
siderable implications for any attempt to incorporate natural law
into constitutional adjudication. The problem is not the moral
skepticism of our times; that is more of a symptom than a cause.
The problem is that we are no longer able to agree upon even the
fundamental suppositions of our existence.
There was a time in our past when our principal mechanism for
regulating and adjusting social relationships was not formal declara-
tions of law, but widely shared cultural customs and traditions. In
that now distant day, law and custom were roughly coterminous and
law simply mimicked the real force for controlling social behavior-
the cultural ethos.248 This was a time in which belief in natural law
was easy because, if only as a matter of description, law appeared to
be inextricably tied to seemingly self-evident propositions about so-
cial organization. But the political, scientific, technological, eco-
nomic, theological, and social revolutions of the last two centuries
have broken that linkage between law and cultural ethos. Without a
shared core of cultural values we have attempted, instead, to govern
our behavior with law, and ever more law. At the same time, our
conception of law has become increasingly positivistic because its
connection to self-evident cultural propositions has been
severed. 24
9
246. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 181 (1961).
247. See WEINREB, supra note 241, at 97-126 (discussing natural law theories of Lon
Fuller, John Finnis, David Richards, and Ronald Dworkin).
248. See, e.g., John Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567, 572-78
(1975).
249. Moreover, the trend toward positivism itself works to further erode the
connection between law and cultural ethos. The cultural binding force of law is sapped
because, in an increasingly positivistic world, "law is ... expected to be artificial." Id. at
574.
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There are several implications in this for natural law. First, natu-
ral law has its most powerful claim to legitimacy in a society with a
commonly shared set of values which are thought transcendent to
temporal deviance. If our society is lacking that fundamental condi-
tion, the role of natural law is necessarily attenuated, but not totally
extinguished. Even in a society lacking a common set of values
there are likely to be some propositions that are overwhelmingly, if
not universally, accepted. In the presumably rare instance when
such norms are contravened by legislatures, it is appropriate for
courts to enforce the culturally shared principle of natural law to
curb the usurpation of the legislature.250
Second, the present time, characterized by deep divisions con-
cerning the proper relationship between moral values and the pol-
ity, is one in which natural law is implicitly asked to hibernate. Since
hibernation is not death, it is appropriate to preserve the mecha-
nisms by which natural law can contribute to our fundamental law at
some future time. It would be an arrogant act for our generation to
expunge natural law from the Constitution. It would be equally ar-
rogant to give to natural law a place in contemporary constitutional
adjudication that is larger than will be supported by the cultural
foundations of our time.
For the present, it is reasonably clear that natural rights inhere in
our culturally shared understandings of those individual practices
which are so basic and fundamental to human liberty that it is be-
yond cavil that governments lack the legitimate moral-authority to
prohibit them. The problem is to define a method by which these
fundamental rights can be identified in a fashion that is tied to some
principle other than the moral predilections of the deciding judge.
There are multiple indicators of the conventional cultural under-
standing that forms the basis for contemporary natural rights. In
the following two sections, I will examine briefly the potential
sources from which we might conclude that there exists a sufficiently
widely shared cultural understanding to support recognition of
unenumerated natural rights as aspects of the rights retained by the
250. An example of this phenomenon might be a law banning married couples from
using contraceptives. It is likely that there is overwhelming, but not universal,
agreement that such a law is repugnant to our current cultural ethos. If so, it seems
illogical to expect such a law to exist. But, of course, such a law did exist (albeit without
much enforcement) in Connecticut until it was invalidated in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965). The most likely explanation for the existence of laws
contrary to the cultural ethos is that laws continue to exist long after the death of the
cultural ethos that they manifested. A rule against perpetuities applicable to statutes
might be a good idea. Cf Guioo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982).
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Ninth Amendment. I will then consider the risks ofjudicial enforce-
ment of natural rights under the Ninth Amendment.
Inferences from the Constitution Itself
One can look to the Constitution itself and derive from the nature
of the guarantees of that document principles which suggest that a
given unenumerated right is within the ambit of those principles.
This is essentially the approach taken by Justice Douglas in Griswold
v. Connecticut,25 1 in which the right of privacy was located in the pe-
numbra of certain relevant enumerated rights, and by Professor
Charles Black's emphasis on the importance of construing any por-
tion of the Constitution by reference to the structural relationships
created by the entire document.2 52
One can also consult the Constitution to determine whether any
given claimed unenumerated right is consistent with the enumer-
ated rights. Determination that any given claimed unenumerated
right is consistent with the enumerated rights might result in a pre-
sumption of the validity of the putative unenumerated right. The
burden would then rest with the government to overcome that pre-
sumption by demonstrating the existence of governmental interests
that are sufficiently powerful to legitimate the exercise of govern-
mental force upon presumptively reserved rights. The effect of this
exercise would certainly be to treat unenumerated rights on a par
with enumerated rights, but would not totally foreclose govern-
ments from legislative initiatives which can be justified.
Both Randy Barnett and Bernard Siegan have advanced some ver-
sion of this argument. Barnett suggested that we "adopt ajustifica-
tory presumption of liberty that puts the burden on government to
show that any interference with the exercise of the rights retained by
the people is justified." 253 Barnett added, of course, that "liberty
does not mean license to do whatever one wishes" and contended
that "[t]he common law ... defines the boundaries within which one
may do as one wishes .... Provided that one is acting rightfully [in
terms of the common law] ... government must justify any interfer-
ence with such conduct." 254 Barnett defended the common law as
the instantiation of natural rights, "the means of giving these other-
wise abstract [natural] rights a conventionally established, specific
251. 381 U.S. at 481-86.
252. See CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969).
253. Barnett, supra note 203, at 630.
254. Id. at 630-31 (footnote omitted).
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content.12 55 The problem with reliance upon the common law is
that it is a highly organic system that has been so radically altered by
legislation that it is no longer, if it ever was, a reliable indicator of
natural rights that would trigger thejustificatory presumption urged
by Barnett. Moreover, if I am correct that the nature of contempo-
rary natural rights inheres in the current cultural ethos, Barnett's jus-
tificatory presumption would never arise, for current positive law
would act as the device to define the boundaries of liberty and it is,
of course, the validity of precisely that law which is the question to
be decided.
Bernard Siegan has proposed that governments be required to
justify all legislation. According to Siegan, governments should
"have the burden of persuading a court .. .that the legislation
serves important governmental objectives;.., that the restraint im-
posed by government is substantially related to achievement of
those objectives, that is.... the fit between means and ends must be
close; and ... that a similar result cannot be achieved by a less dras-
tic means. ' 256 Siegan's position is one which derives considerable
support from the original structure of the Constitution, a document
which created a central government of carefully circumscribed pow-
ers. Given the limited grant of powers to the central government
and the reservation of all rights (intended as a device to limit the
growth by implication of the limited powers of government) it is en-
tirely reasonable to place upon the government, rather than the citi-
zen, the burden of justifying the validity of its conduct. If the
modern meaning of the Ninth Amendment is to be found by bring-
ing "constitutional cy pres" to bear upon it, Siegan's test is well
adapted to the furtherance of that goal.
Siegan's test does not mean that courts will invalidate all legisla-
tive initiatives that impinge upon matters which have previously es-
caped regulation. In examining the justification offered by the
government for any given legislation, courts ought to give consider-
able weight to the needs of the entire community, presumably ex-
pressed in the legislation under scrutiny. Mary Ann Glendon has
properly excoriated our tendency to speak of rights with "exagger-
ated absoluteness .... hyperindividualism, and ... silence with re-
spect to personal, civic, and collective responsibilities. ' 257 Glendon
contended that "[o]ur stark, simple rights dialect puts a damper on
the processes of public justification, communication, and delibera-
255. Id. at 631 n.52.
256. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 324 (1980).
257. MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE, at x (1991).
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tion upon which the continuing vitality of a democratic regime de-
pends ... [and] contributes to the erosion of the habits, practices,
and attitudes of respect for others that are the ultimate and surest
guarantors of human rights."2 5 8 When confronted with challenges
to legislation, and in the course of applying Siegan's test, it is en-
tirely proper to uphold legislation which substantially serves some
pressing public need, and does so in a fashion that impinges upon
liberty in a fashion that is proportionate to the public benefits ob-
tainable only through the legislation.25
9
History and Tradition
The history and traditions of our national experience ought also
to be consulted, not to divine the "most specific tradition avail-
able," 260 but to determine "the balance which our Nation, built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized soci-
ety .... [It] is the balance struck by this country, having regard to
what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as
well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living
258. Id. at 171.
259. This is an approach that is similar to that taken by the Supreme Court of Canada
in deciding when legislative infringements of rights guaranteed under the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms are "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
CAN. CONST. (Constitutional Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)
§ 1. In Regina v. Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada established the following test for
justification of legislative invasions of Charter rights:
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the
objective in question. . . . [T]hey must be rationally connected to the
objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the
objective .. , should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in
question.... Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects
of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or
freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of 'sufficient
importance.'
I S.C.R. 103, 139 (Can. 1986).
The European Court of Human Rights employs a similar analysis. Article 8, § 1 of the
European Convention on Human Rights guarantees "respect for.., private life" but § 2
permits governments to interfere with that right when it is "necessary" to do so "in the
interests of national security, public safety .... economic well-being of the country....
prevention of disorder or crime,. . . protection of health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others." Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, effective 1953, reprinted in COUNCIL OF Eu-
ROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTS 104-05 (1979). In
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 164-65 (1981) (Commis-
sion), the Court interpreted "necessary" to mean (1) the existence of some pressing
social need and (2) the presence of proportionality between the restriction imposed by
the challenged legislation and the legitimate aims sought to be accomplished by the
legislation.
260. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989).
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thing." 261 Our history and traditions are dynamic rather than static.
They are not snapshots, frozen in time, in our family photo album;
rather, they consist of a continuously running motion picture, to
which new frames are added every moment of our existence.
It is mistaken to think, as do Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, that we
can consult some static and specific referent to derive meaning from
history and tradition. Indeed, modest reflection upon the possible
referents that could be used illustrate the problem. Neither the ab-
sence nor presence of positive law bearing upon a particular claimed
right can be dispositive. It is difficult to attribute meaning to the
absence of law, and a long pattern of unconstitutional regulation
only establishes a continuing legislative contempt for our funda-
mental law.262 "Moreover, historical traditions, like rights them-
selves, exist at various levels of generality." 263 Nor is it easy to
identify how we measure specificity when examining history and tra-
dition. It is not clear whether this specificity refers to positive law or
social attitudes and, if the latter, what device is appropriate to detect
social attitudes. If there is no specific tradition available to tell us
whether women desiring to abort are required to notify their hus-
bands of their intent to do so, where do we turn for the most rele-
vant specific tradition? Do we look to more general traditions
concerning women's reproductive freedom, or to traditions con-
cerning fetuses, or to traditions concerning a husband's control of
his wife? Justice Scalia asserts that we must rely on. the most specific
tradition available, but he has no guidance for us here.
When consulting the garbled text of history and tradition, it is
inevitable that choices must be made concerning the relevant evi-
dence. Rather than pretending that there are, in fact, readily identi-
fiable static and specific referents we ought, instead, look at the
vectors of history-the rate, direction, and nature of change in our
cultural ethos. A static perspective upon history and tradition
would suggest that we have an entrenched practice of denying wo-
men the same measure of personal autonomy we have accorded
men. Thus, for example, a statute that conditions availability of
abortion upon the woman's proof that she has notified her husband
of her intent to abort might be considered consistent with history
and tradition. But if the vector of our history and tradition is con-
sulted, one would be forced to admit that it points to ever increasing
261. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
262. "[N]o one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by
long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national experience and indeed
predates it." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
263. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 230, at 100.
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recognition of the fundamental equality between the sexes as auton-
omous individuals. From this perspective, the same statute would
seem to be at odds with a dynamic conception of our history and
tradition. Because our contemporary conception of natural rights is
one that relies on a shared cultural ethos, it is all the more impor-
tant to choose the vectors of history rather than the tombstones of
history to guide us in locating natural enumerated rights.
The Risks of Judicial Enforcement of Natural Rights
This process of divining natural rights is one that carries a great
deal of risk, for the Court is not always certain to make the correct
judgment that any given claimed natural right is sufficiently well-
grounded in our cultural ethos to constitute such a right. Indeed,
when the Court recognizes the existence of an unenumerated right,
and that recognition itself becomes a bitter political issue, it is quite
possible it has erred. Thus, the Court was correct to recognize the
unenumerated natural right of married couples to use contracep-
tives, 264 but possibly wrong to have recognized the right to termi-
nate pregnancy as an unenumerated natural right.265
Moreover, there is no certainty that the Court is the correct insti-
tution to make this judgment. If natural rights in our time come
down to ajudgment about the current cultural understanding of the
nature of such rights, why aren't democratically elected legislators
more qualified than judges to make this determination? 266 One an-
swer may be that, given the evident constitutional bias toward mak-
ing the government an island of powers in a sea of rights, it is
appropriate not to vest too much trust in the organ that wields those
powers-the legislature. But if doubt persists on this point, it might
be appropriate to consider some judicially created version of the
power given to Canadian legislatures, both national and provincial,
to override certain constitutional guarantees.2 67 In fashioning natu-
264. Griswold v. Connecticut, 386 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965).
265. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). This is not to suggest that Roe v.
Wade was wrongly decided as a matter of constitutional law. It is to suggest that the
Court was wrong to treat the right at issue as an unenumerated natural right. Of course,
the Court said it was proceeding under the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause,
but the decision makes far more sense if it is reconstructed as an instance of recognizing
and enforcing an unenumerated natural right. The Court would have done better to
ground the right to terminate pregnancy in the Equal Protection Clause.
266. For some of the arguments germane to this point, see Calvin R. Massey, The
Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional
Traditions of Canada and the United States, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1300-07.
267. See CAN. CONST. (Constitutional Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 33. Either Parliament or a provincial legislature may declare that its
legislation supersedes the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Charter. Such action is
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ral rights under the Ninth Amendment, the Court might treat the
rights thus established as only provisionally created, pending some
definitive, explicit, and unequivocal repudiation by Congress. This
is an iterative scheme that is much like the current relationship be-
tween Court and Congress with respect to the dormant, or negative,
commerce clause.
Another mechanism by which to respond to the doubt that courts
are the appropriate vehicle to enforce unenumerated rights might
be ajudicially created doctrine that such rights are subject to a much
weaker version of stare decisis than is generally applicable to constitu-
tional doctrine. This would, of course, make it easier for the Court
to retreat from the recognition of new natural rights when it be-
comes obvious that there is no cultural ethos supporting the right.
In a sense, both the weak version of stare decisis and the judicially
created version of Canada's override power seem to fly in the face of
the Ninth Amendment's textual injunction not to disparage the
unenumerated rights, for I do not make any suggestion that these
doctrines would apply to enumerated rights. I have no powerful re-
buttal to the objection. At bottom, my defense of these proposals
rests primarily on the dubious ground of pragmatism. Given the
skepticism, if not downright antagonism, with which discussion of
the legitimacy of natural rights is greeted, I am casting about for
methods which might make the medicine of natural law slide a bit
easier down the throats of orthodox positivists. It is neither easy to
reconstruct natural law in a positivistic world nor to sell the product
to a skeptical audience. This is a tentative attempt in that direction.
CONCLUSION
Natural law has a long association with American ideas of funda-
mental law, both prior to, during, and after the Revolution. The
tradition of judicial enforcement of natural rights as part of the fun-
damental law, thereby voiding contrary legislation, is equally long
but considerably more controversial. The Ninth Amendment was
intended, in part, to instantiate the natural law tradition. It was also
designed to preserve, as against federal legislative invasion, rights
secured under state constitutions and was thought to be a device by
which the expansion of federal legislative powers by implication
could be prevented. There is thus a reasonable warrant in the
limited in effectiveness for five years, but a legislature may renew the declaration for an
unlimited number of successive five year terms. Id. Thus, if a national or provincial
legislative majority feels strong enough about a matter, guaranteed human liberties may
be eliminated in perpetuity.
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"original intentions" of the founders to treat the Ninth Amendment
as a source of judicially enforceable natural rights.
Even if one were to suppose that the only intended function of the
Ninth Amendment was to guard against the extension of federal
power by implication, there is good reason to treat the Ninth
Amendment today as a source of individual rights which trump leg-
islative powers. The battle against extending federal power by im-
plication has been hopelessly lost. If the Ninth Amendment is to
perform anything close to its originally intended function it is neces-
sary to employ some form of constitutional cy pres to accomplish that
object.
The problem of defining and locating natural rights in a princi-
pled fashion is not hopeless. Natural rights do exist in our positivis-
tic world. In a sense, like Justice Stewart, we know them when we
see them. Natural rights inhere in the cultural ethos that is widely
shared. There may be relatively few instances of such rights that are
also abrogated by legislative majorities, but they do occur. On
those occasions, it is appropriate for courts to enforce the natural
rights dimension of the Ninth Amendment. If there are doubts
about the wisdom of courts acting in this manner, there are several
devices available to us to temper this judicial action, by making judi-
cial recognition of such rights subject to legislative revision or sus-
ceptible to review without the restraining effect of stare decisis.
We may live in a time of legal positivism and moral skepticism but
it may not always be so. A small but increasing number of observers
have begun to realize that "the Cartesian-Newtonian conception of
the universe as a machine filled with separate objects" 268 whose re-
lationships are governed by principles of linear causality fails to de-
scribe observable phenomena.2 69 Instead, many westerners are
discovering "that the Eastern conceptions of related duality-
stressing dynamism, rhythm, balance, and harmony-describe an
organic, holistic world that more closely approximates observable
phenomena than the Cartesian-Newtonian view." 270 In this emerg-
ing world-view opposites are no longer warring "thesis" and "an-
tithesis" but paired complements. "Light does not struggle with
dark for ultimate supremacy; rather, there would be no understand-
ing of either concept without its complementary twin. The focus is
268. GEOFFREY WALKER, THE RULE OF LAw: FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 44 (1988).
269. See, e.g., id.; Calvin R. Massey, Rule of Law and the Age of Aquarius, 41 HASTINGS L. J.
757 (1990); Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can
Learnfrom Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989).
270. Massey, supra note 269, at 762.
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no longer upon either aspect of a diad, but upon the relationship be-
tween them." 271 The organizing principle of a world-view centered
on relationships between connected phenomena is one of maintain-
ing "dynamic balance." 272 The implications of this world-view may
not be fully appreciated as yet, but if it does begin to describe for us
the meaning of our existence it may well lead to a state of affairs
where we feel or sense a greater number of "certainties." Should
that come to pass, the ontological versions of natural law will walk
the legal landscape again. We would be arrogant custodians of our
fundamental law to expel natural law entirely from our discourse.
Natural law deserves a role in our fundamental law. In our present
world, its role is deservedly small, but it should not be shunned as a
pariah.
271. Id.
272. WALKER, supra note 268, at 47.

